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Executive Summary 
New Zealand should meet its Kyoto liability at least cost 
New Zealand has made commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol. New Zealand’s commitments should be met “at the lowest 
achievable long-term cost” (MfE and Treasury, 2007).  
The Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill 
introduces an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Under the scheme, the main 
emission-producing sectors would be made responsible for reducing their 
emissions and helping New Zealand meet the Kyoto liability. Firms would be 
allocated permits to emit a defined quantity of greenhouse gases. Firms that emit 
more than their permits must buy extra permits; firms that emit less can sell their 
surplus permits.  
The main alternative is that New Zealand pays for all its Kyoto liability out of 
general taxes – essentially Government buys recognised emission reductions 
abroad or in New Zealand. 
In its current design, the ETS is not least cost 
Market instruments, such as tradable emission permits, are generally preferred 
over this alternative because they attach the cost of emitting to the emitting 
activity, provide flexibility to reduce emissions at least cost, and create a 
continuous incentive for improvement. An emission trading scheme could meet 
the Government’s objective of meeting Kyoto obligations at least cost, but only if 
its design takes account of the extent to which our trading partners also face these 
costs.
1  
The regulatory impact statement attached to the Bill states that the 
“macroeconomic impact, as represented by a variety of indicators is very small. 
This is consistent with the message that the impact under Kyoto would be around 
0.1 percent of GDP” This statement also reports that the modelling has shown that 
in the long run an “ETS reduces the impact of meeting our international 
obligations over the case where government remains responsible for all emissions. 
For example private consumption fell by 1 percent in the scenario where the 
government is responsible but only 0.7 percent under an ETS.”  
Our analysis, however, shows both that the costs are greater, and that the design 
proposed in the Bill is not least cost. This is primarily because the ETS, as 
currently designed, does not adequately deal with New Zealand’s exposure 
domestically and in export markets to competition from producers in countries 
that do not face the costs of their emissions. 
                                                 
1  A full analysis of the design issues and preconditions for a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme are 
covered in NZIER (2007).  
NZIER – The impact of the proposed Emissions Trading Scheme on New Zealand’s economy  ii 
Model compares impact of an ETS to paying for liability out of taxes 
We adapted an internationally recognized and respected CGE model to the New 
Zealand setting. Key assumptions have been tested with industry specialists and 
reflect best practice. The approach here is different from other work because it: 
•  captures some of the adjustment costs in the economy 
•  incorporates information on abatement costs specific to New Zealand 
•  quantifies the risk of ‘leakage’, where “New Zealand will incur economic costs 
while the global environment suffers” (Kerr, 2007) 
The analytical framework used is to model the New Zealand economy in some 
detail, and forecast the hypothetical future state of the economy without any 
attempts to meet Kyoto targets. We then consider the impacts of an ETS as 
proposed and compare this to the New Zealand Government paying for emissions 
reductions out of general taxation.  
Short term, the proposed ETS would reduce employment and profits 
In 2012, the economic impact of the ETS and the cost of New Zealand’s Kyoto 
liability is a: 
•  $900 million reduction in GDP (0.5%) 
•  $600 reduction in an average household’s spending (0.8%) 
•  reduction in employment equivalent to 22,000 jobs (1.0%) 
Most of these costs come from the way the ETS works through the economy, 
rather than from paying directly for the remainder of New Zealand’s Kyoto 
liability.  
Of the $900 million reduction in GDP, $800 million is directly attributable to the 
ETS. That is the ETS would cost 8 times more. 
Long term, living standards will be lower than they would have been  
Longer term, once the free allocation of emission credits have been phased out 
and the ETS covers substantially all greenhouse gas emissions, including those 
from agriculture, the ETS is four times more costly than the alternative of paying 
directly out of taxes for emissions reductions. 
In 2025, the combined economic impact of an ETS and the cost of paying for an 
international emission reduction obligation (in today’s prices), is a: 
•  $5.9 billion reduction in GDP (-2.1%) 
•  $3,000 reduction in an average household’s spending (-3.0%) 
•  reduction in hourly wages equivalent to $2.30 per hour (-6.7%), or $90 a week 
for someone working 40 hours a week  
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Of that $5.9 billion reduction in GDP, $4.6 billion is directly attributable to the 
ETS.  
Of course, GDP per capita would still be 42% higher in 2025 than it was in 2007. 
But that is still less than Australia’s GDP per capita today. That highlights that it 
is critical to seek least cost solutions before committing to any increase in cost on 
the economy.   
…yet emission reductions are not as large 
Moreover, for all the additional cost that an ETS imposes on the New Zealand 
economy, New Zealand achieves 5% less emissions reductions, in terms of 
contribution to global emissions, than we could achieve if we funded emissions 
reductions elsewhere in the world or at home.  
As proposed, the ETS is not a least cost climate change solution… 
This is for two reasons. First, New Zealand production becomes more costly and 
less competitive compared to production elsewhere in the world leading to 
reductions in emissions in New Zealand but increased emissions elsewhere in the 
world. Second, our emissions reductions are expensive. Cheaper alternatives are 
available elsewhere. 
Thus, the ETS as currently proposed is not the least cost solution for mitigating 
the impacts of climate change.  
This finding is in line with earlier work by NZIER: 
The reality is that it may prove cheaper to pay emitters in another 
country to reduce emissions rather than to achieve any reduction 
within New Zealand. (NZIER, 2007) 
…unless producers in other countries also pay for their emissions 
The main reason is our assumption that New Zealand producers exposed to import 
competition or New Zealand exporters are unable to increase their prices to reflect 
the cost of climate change mitigation policies. If climate change measures are 
adopted elsewhere in the world such that that assumption no longer holds true, 
then we would need to revise our analysis.     
Agriculture will be hit hardest through reduced competitiveness… 
The proposed ETS would increase costs largely in export industries, especially the 
agricultural sector. In the agricultural sector in 2025: 
•  dairy farming declines 12.9%  
•  dairy land prices fall 40.6%. 
•  sheep and beef farming declines 6.6%  
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•  the price of land used in sheep and beef farming falls 23.4%   
The impact on the agricultural sector is also a major source of leakage – where 
emission reductions occur in New Zealand only because our production is 
replaced with production elsewhere in the world. Our analysis suggests that the 
ETS would cause leakage from the pastoral sector to more than the equivalent of 3 
million tonnes of CO2 – around a quarter of the emission reductions resulting 
from the ETS.  
Another sector heavily affected is basic metals manufacturing.  Investment 
declines, plant, machinery and equipment, and other capital falls by 6.5%, and 
there is a 3.4% reduction in employment. 
…and rural regions will shoulder a larger burden than urban centres 
 
Impacts on regional GDP, 2025 
% change to what might otherwise have been 





















Variation in impacts of the ETS across different industries also means quite 
variable impacts across New Zealand’s regions - as regions have different 
concentrations of industries. The regional economies of Northland and Southland 
contract more than others, because both regions have significant concentrations of 
agricultural production and substantial employment in other large industries 
shrunk by the ETS – basic metals (aluminium) manufacturing in Southland and 
petroleum refining in Northland.  
Regions with high concentrations of service industries and public sector 
employment, such as Auckland and Wellington, do not contract by as much as 
more rural regions.   
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The right permit allocation scheme would reduce the cost of an ETS  
The impacts of an ETS change considerably when partial free allocation of 
emissions permits are not phased out. In 2025, an ETS with indefinite free 
allocation reduces GDP by 1.2% compared to 2.1% under the ETS with free 
allocation phasing out.  Emissions reductions are 4.2% compared to 10.4% under 
phased out free allocation, but leakage of emissions of almost 2,900 kt CO2-e are 
completely eliminated.   
This result arises because indefinite free allocation of permits at initial allocation 
levels – i.e. not entirely free allocation –  cuts the harm to export competitiveness.  
We find that costs to the economy are more sensitive to changes in the quantity of 
permits allocated freely to industry and agriculture than to assumptions about 
emissions reductions from technology change. 
Our research confirms conclusions from other qualitative reviews 
The Government commissioned review of the proposed ETS reached conclusions 
that are similar to ours (Kerr, 2007): 
…several very important aspects of the proposal require further 
development… [including] …the need for clear thinking on interred 
leakage and allocation issues; how to achieve a smooth, low risk 
transition; (p.1) 
Any policy used to address leakage should be simple and closely 
targeted. It should be designed to phase out as other countries 
regulate their emissions. (p.7) 
In the agriculture sector, [output-based or intensity-based allocation] 
could simultaneously address the question of how to freely allocate 
units that intend to compensate for capital losses (loss of land values). 
(p.7) 
Previous research reports have come to similar conclusions (Skilling and Boven 
(2007) and Castalia (2007)).  
Implications 
We find that, as long as there is no comprehensive global commitment, paying 
directly for emissions reductions out of general taxation is cheaper and more 
effective than the ETS as is currently designed. Our results are robust to 
sensitivity testing. 
This means that if the Government intends to proceed with the ETS, then it should 
amend the allocation and phase-out rules to minimise the costs to the economy.  
NZIER – The impact of the proposed Emissions Trading Scheme on New Zealand’s economy  vi 
NZIER (2007) has already suggested how the issue of permit allocation could best 
be dealt with to minimise unnecessary costs to firms facing international 
competition. We have proposed: 
•  New Zealand firms subject to international competition from producers likely 
to be facing no or limited effective emissions charges should receive a gratis 
allocation of emission entitlements. 
•  To incentivise the firm receiving the entitlement to reduce its emissions, but 
not constrain efficient growth in output, the level of gratis allocation should, if 
practicable, be based on an international ‘best practice’ standard per unit of 
output. 
•  The ‘best practice’ standard could be set at the world best standard or at some 
point, such as, the upper quartile or top decile level for plants in an 
international peer group for which data are available.  
For smaller entities, the information costs of finding and checking peer group data 
may be too great, and their gratis allocation could be based on some percentage 
less than 100% of their historical emissions per unit of output. They should have 
the option of having their allocation determined on the basis of the emissions of 
an international peer group if they wish, however.  
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1. Introduction 
This report considers the impact of the proposed Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) on New Zealand’s economy.  
We consider the impacts compared to what would happen if the Government paid 
for reductions in greenhouse gases anywhere in the world. We also consider what 
the impacts of an ETS would be if Government did not phase out free allocations 
of emission units as is currently envisaged.  
To date there has been a significant amount of research considering New Zealand 
specific issues relating to climate change and climate change policies. Our 
research differs from most of the existing research in that it evaluates the 
quantitative impact of the ETS as proposed in the “Climate Change Bill” as 
opposed to a more general assessment of a hypothetical emission mitigation 
strategy or general trading system.
1 
In our view there has been insufficient research investigating the Government’s 
choice of design for an ETS in New Zealand.
2 Our research is intended to go some 
way towards rectifying this, although further work will still be needed.  
While a quantitative analysis of the proposed ETS has already been carried out by 
Infometrics (2007), that analysis assumed (unconventionally) very limited impact 
on the productive side of the New Zealand economy and as a result understated 
both the short and long term effects of the proposed ETS.  
The regulatory impact statement attached to the Climate Change Bill referenced 
the Infometrics (2007) analysis, stating that the “macroeconomic impact, as 
represented by a variety of indicators is very small. This is consistent with the 
message that the impact under Kyoto would be around 0.1 percent of GDP” This 
statement also reports that the modelling has shown that in the long run an “ETS 
reduces the impact of meeting our international obligations over the case where 
government remains responsible for all emissions. For example private 
consumption fell by 1 percent in the scenario where the government is responsible 
but only 0.7 percent under an ETS.”  
As noted in the Government commissioned review of the proposed scheme (Kerr, 
2007): 
The costs and structural shifts could be significantly higher than the 
Infometrics report implies. (p.8) 
                                                 
1 See for example, NZIER (2001), or McKibbin and Pierce (1997) 
2 At least, insufficient research that has been made public. There may have been significant analysis done 
behind the scenes.   
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Our analysis is still likely to understate the overall costs and structural shifts in the 
economy caused by the proposed ETS but the extent of the understatement will be 
less compared to the Infometrics (2007) study; see section 4.2 for a more in depth 
discussion of how our approach differs from that used in the Infometrics (2007) 
study.  
We also add to existing research by paying special attention to plans for the 
allocation of emission permits under the proposed ETS. We evaluate the effects of 
phasing out of free allocations of emission permits by 2025 – the default 
mechanism for permit allocation in the proposed scheme – compared against an 
alternative more accommodating allocation plan.  
The way that emissions permits are allocated is a very important design feature of 
the ETS. Firms facing international competition (whether from competition from 
imports or competition in export markets) will have difficulty competing if New 
Zealand places a cost on their emissions but their competitors do not face 
equivalent emission costs. If reduced competitiveness leads to production shifting 
from New Zealand to other countries without the same constraints on emissions 
this can lead to the perverse situation where New Zealand bears a cost without any 
commensurate reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions.  
The Government commissioned review of the proposed ETS noted that allocation 
issues required “further development” (Kerr, 2007). Our analysis is intended to 
shed light on just how important (or unimportant) such “further development” is.   
To provide context to our report, we begin with a discussion about the nature of 
greenhouse gas emissions in New Zealand, New Zealand’s international 
obligations to reduce emissions and the role of an ETS in New Zealand in 
contributing to global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. We also provide a 
summary of the ETS and how it is expected to work.  
Our analysis is quantitative and our results come from an applied “General 
Equilibrium” model of the New Zealand economy. This kind of model 
incorporates the many different interrelationships in an economy and provides a 
net read out. It is well suited to evaluating the way that the impacts of an ETS 
flow through the economy.  
The model we use is not a magic crystal ball for telling the future – no model is – 
but it certainly has as much information in it for understanding the impacts of an 
ETS on the economy as any other analytical approach currently available. We 
discuss the model in Section 3.  
In Section 4 we describe the scenarios that we have evaluated and discuss some of 
the assumptions we have made to help us evaluate the ETS. The assumptions we 
discuss include the likely price of greenhouse gas emissions that firms will face 
under an ETS and our view of what the economy will look like in the future 
without an ETS.  
NZIER – The impact of the proposed Emissions Trading Scheme on New Zealand’s economy  3 
Of course, some of our assumptions can have large impacts on the magnitude of 
our results, so following discussion of our results in Section 5 we summarise how 
sensitive our results are to some key assumptions (Section 6). In the context of 
sensitivity analyses we also consider how sensitive the economy is to variations in 
one core design feature of the ETS – the quantity of allocations of emission 
permits to firms. This sensitivity helps us to gauge just how important free 
allocation is to the balance of impacts on the NZ economy and the potential for 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions due to the ETS.   
2. The climate change challenge 
2.1  Kyoto commitments require action
3 
New Zealand has an obligation to respond to climate change under its 
international commitments embodied in the United Nations Framework 
Convention for Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.  
In 1992 the international community recognised the potential negative impacts of 
climate change impacts by adopting the United Nations Framework Convention 
for Climate Change (UNFCCC). This aimed to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations at a level that would prevent major human-induced interference 
with the climate system and implied major reductions in global emissions 
compared to current levels and future business as usual (BAU) projections. 
By the mid 1990s it became clear that the Framework Convention targets were not 
being met, largely because the Convention lacked teeth to give them effect. In 
December 1997 UNFCCC parties signed the Kyoto Protocol, which would 
commit developed countries to legally binding emission reduction obligations. It 
also provided for flexibility mechanisms to enable these commitments to be 
traded between countries so that emission reductions could be located where they 
were least costly to achieve.
4 
The aim of the Protocol was to reduce the emissions across the developed country 
participants to around 5% below their level in 1990, as a first step towards deeper 
and more widespread reductions in future periods. New Zealand’s primary 
obligation is to monitor its emissions of the six Kyoto greenhouse gases over the 
years 2008 to 2012 and ensure that on average they are equal to or less than 1990 
emissions, or otherwise take responsibility for emissions above that level.
5 
                                                 
3  Most of the discussion below is from NZIER (2001). 
4   There are three flexibility mechanisms under the Protocol: International Emissions Trading, between 
countries or individual companies; Joint Implementation, whereby reductions undertaken in one developed 
country receive entitlements transferred from another; and the Clean Development Mechanism, whereby 
developed countries can create additional assigned amounts through achieving certified emission 
reductions in developing countries. 
5  The greenhouse gases are methane, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons 
and sulphur hexafluoride. In compiling national inventories the gases are converted to carbon dioxide 
equivalents. Methane and carbon dioxide are by far the largest components of New Zealand’s inventory.  
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Each country has an assigned amount of emission entitlement based on a 
historical level of emissions. To meet its Kyoto obligations New Zealand will 
have to show that it has sufficient assigned amount to match its reported 
emissions at the end of the commitment period. To do this it will have to reduce 
its domestic emissions, buy assigned amount from other countries, or generate 
new assigned amounts through the creation of carbon sinks by new tree planting. 
By allowing entitlements to be traded between nations, emission reduction should 
take place up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement equals the 
marginal cost of alternatives, which is in turn reflected in the international price of 
emission entitlements. 
Under Kyoto, emission rights can be traded amongst countries, and from that 
market an international emission price can arise. New Zealand, as a small 
participant, will have to accept that price. In other words, no matter what policy 
New Zealand pursues, the international permit price will not be affected. Stated 
differently, New Zealand will be a price taker in the market for emissions permits. 
As all participating countries will therefore face the same international price of 
emission entitlements, such a system will tend to relocate abatement to those 
countries where it can be achieved at least cost. However, a feature of the Kyoto 
Protocol is that, at least for the first commitment period, not all major emitting 
countries will face binding emission restraints. Developing countries will not face 
any restriction on their emissions, and will obtain a cost advantage over 
comparable production in the participating developed countries until participation 
in the Kyoto mechanisms broadens to truly global coverage. It is intended that this 
will occur some time after 2012. 
At a minimum, the government, as a party to the Protocol, will have responsibility 
for New Zealand’s excess emissions, which it can either discharge by buying 
emission entitlements on the international market, or by encouraging domestic 
emission abatement or sink creation. All of these options are likely to impose 
costs on the government, which it can recover through general taxation spread 
across the community. Alternatively, the Protocol allows it to devolve 
responsibility for emissions to New Zealand entities and individuals through 
direct measures, such as emissions trading by domestic entities or the imposition 
of a carbon tax. Such measures would be more selective and have costs that fall 
particularly on those whose actions create the excess emissions. 
2.2  Greenhouse gas emissions and the NZ economy 
The make-up of New Zealand’s emissions is peculiar compared to most other 
countries, especially other developed or rich countries. That is because most of 
our emissions come from agriculture and animals in particular.   
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In other countries, the main sources of emissions are typically from producing 
energy – whether for industry or for transport or homes.  
 
Figure 1 Greenhouse gas emissions by gas 




















Source:  Ministry for the Environment (2006b), United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (2006) 
 
The Kyoto Protocol counts six gases in assessing anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions – carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), two 
groups of synthetic gases known as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). In 2004, New Zealand’s 
emissions of these gases, defined in terms of carbon dioxide equivalents, was 
around 75 million tonnes (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 2006). This followed average annual emissions growth of 1.4 per cent 
over the period 1990 to 2004, compared with a 0.7 per cent decline across all  
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Annex 1 countries 
(OECD countries plus Eastern European economies in transition).  
 
Figure 2 Greenhouse gas emissions by sector 


























Source: Ministry for the Environment (2006b), United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (2006) 
 
Nevertheless, our emissions remain just 0.4 per cent of the total greenhouse gas 
emissions of Annex 1 countries – those countries with obligations to reduce 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. Per capita, New Zealand’s carbon dioxide 
emissions are well below the median of Annex 1 countries and less than half the 
per capita emissions of Australia, Canada and the USA. Per unit of GDP, our 
carbon dioxide emissions are sixth highest in US dollar terms or twelfth highest in 
purchasing power parity terms. This suggests that New Zealand has slightly more 
emissions intensive production than many other countries and may suffer greater  
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economic impacts in reducing emissions to meet targets under the Kyoto Protocol 
or other agreements. 
New Zealand has a quite different emissions profile to other Annex 1 countries, as 
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Across Annex 1 countries, emissions are 
dominated by carbon dioxide (83 per cent) and come largely from the energy 
sector (63 per cent). In contrast, over half New Zealand’s emissions are methane 
and nitrous oxide, which account for only 15 per cent of Annex 1 countries’ total 
emissions. The agricultural sector emits half our emissions, compared with only 
seven per cent across Annex 1 countries.  
2.3  The ETS as a way to address climate change 
In releasing its package of climate change proposals, the government announced 
its decisions “in principle” on the introduction of an ETS (Ministry for the 
Environment Government, 2007).  
The ETS is different to, but not entirely distinguishable from, New Zealand’s 
obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the UN Framework 
Convention on  Climate Change (UNFCCC). As a participant in the UNFCCC 
and being a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol which arose out of the UNFCCC, 
New Zealand has taken on obligations to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels – in order to play a part in mitigating the negative effects of climate 
change. 
The ETS is one scheme that can be used to address climate change and the idea of 
emissions trading is also in the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol allows for 
international trade in emission reductions that could ultimately form the basis of 
an international emissions trading scheme.  
Allowing for trade in emissions recognises that it doesn’t matter where in the 
world greenhouse gases are produced or reduced – any increase or reduction in 
greenhouse gases will have approximately the same impact on climate change 
whether it takes place in New Zealand or in Australia or any other country in the 
world. That being the case, trade in emissions can therefore lead to reductions 
taking place wherever it costs the least, without compromising the goal of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
Having a domestic ETS is one way of ensuring that New Zealand can link into 
any such international trading scheme, although no such scheme has yet emerged. 
A domestic ETS also has the benefit of making New Zealand consumers and 
producers responsive to the amount of greenhouse gases they produce or 
consume.  
A domestic ETS can also help to ensure that any emission reductions within New 
Zealand will take place in sectors where it is cheapest to make reductions.   
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A domestic ETS doesn’t have the same merits as an international ETS. Taking 
unilateral action to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions can lead to “leakage”, 
where production shifts to countries that don’t impose constraints on emissions. 
This can even lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions if production relocates 
to countries that are more emission intensive because, for example, a greater 
proportion of their electricity is generated from fossil fuels like gas and coal than 
is the case in New Zealand. 
“Leakage” was raised as an issue that requires significantly more attention in the 
Government commissioned review of the proposed ETS (Kerr, 2007):  
If significant leakage occurs, some firms and workers in New Zealand 
will incur economic costs while the global environment suffers. (p. 6) 
That said, the ETS is not the only measure that the Government is pursuing in 
relation to climate change. Indeed the Government has introduced a package of 
measures to address climate change and to help meet its international obligations 
to contribute to minimising the build up of greenhouse gases in the earth’s 
atmosphere. The ETS is just a major part of that overall package.   
2.3.1 Basic design 
The government’s in principle decisions on the basic design of the NZ ETS are: 
•  the NZ ETS will involve an obligation on participants to hold emission units 
that match the emissions levels for which they are responsible; a limited 
number of New Zealand emission units will be issued each year, and the 
scheme will operate within the global cap on emissions set by the Kyoto 
Protocol 
•  the NZ ETS will, over time, include all major sectors (i.e. forestry, transport, 
stationary energy, industrial processes (non-energy), agriculture and waste) and 
the six greenhouse gases specified in the Kyoto Protocol 
•  the NZ ETS will involve the devolution to landowners of both the credits for 
forestry activities that lead to a removal of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, and the liabilities for the subsequent release of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere (by harvesting or deforestation) 
•  the NZ ETS will be introduced across the economy in a staged process to allow 
gradual adjustment to emissions pricing: 
−  forestry will be introduced on 1 January 2008  
−  liquid fossil fuels on 1 January 2009 
−  stationary energy and industrial process emissions from 1 January 2010   
−  agriculture, waste and all other emissions from 1 January 2013 
•  the NZ ETS will include three types of participants: 
−  participants with obligations to surrender emission units to cover their direct 
emissions or the emissions associated with their products  
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−  participants who receive freely allocated emission units, or receive emission 
units for eligible afforestation, or hold other emission units that can be 
traded to other parties  
−  participants who engage in trading activities to take advantage of market 
opportunities 
•  the core obligation will be for participants with unit obligations to surrender to 
the government one emission unit to cover each metric tonne of eligible 
emissions in a compliance period (usually a calendar year); the obligation is 
absolute, rather than intensity-based, so does not vary with the level of output 
•  the New Zealand Unit (NZU) will be the primary domestic unit of trade; for the 
first commitment period, NZUs will be fully comparable to, and backed by, 
Kyoto units by the end of the period for determining compliance 
•  the NZ ETS will allow both sales to, and purchases from, international trading 
markets, to aid market liquidity and to provide a safety valve on price 
•  participants will face binding consequences for non-compliance with their 
obligations, including penalties and make-good provisions 
•  the NZ ETS could potentially be augmented by an offset mechanism, which 
would allow people without ETS obligations to earn emission credits for 
activities resulting in a reduction in total greenhouse gases being released into 
the atmosphere  
•  the NZ ETS will be adaptable to future changes to New Zealand’s obligations 
under the international climate change policy framework post-2012 and 
continue to function even if there is a hiatus between the end of the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the implementation of a 
successor international agreement. 
2.3.2 Initial allocation of emission units 
The government has decided in principle to allocate NZUs initially through a 
combination of sale and free allocation. In free allocation, as a form of assistance 
to business, it has decided in principle that: 
•  in the forestry sector, the free allocation will be: 
−  from 2008 to 2012, 21 million tonnes CO2-e for plantation forest, plus a 
relatively small allocation set aside for forest weed control 
−  from 2013, an additional 34 million tonnes CO2-e for plantation forest (i.e. 
taking the total free allocation to owners of pre-1990 exotic forest land to 55 
million tonnes) 
•  the agricultural sector will be provided with a free allocation equal to 90 per 
cent of its 2005 emissions 
•  eligible industrial producers will be provided with a free allocation equal to 90 
per cent of their 2005 or, if firms choose, 2003 or 2004 emissions 
•  over 2013 to 2025, the free allocation pools for industrial producers and 
agriculture will be reduced each year, on a linear basis (i.e. zero from 2026)  
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•  new sources that begin emitting during the period of the free allocation will not 
have any access to the pool of free allocations 
•  firms that cease trading will not retain any free allocations  
•  no free allocation will be provided to the upstream points of obligation in the 
liquid fossil fuel and stationary energy sectors (including electricity generators) 
and landfill operators.   
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3.  Our model of the NZ economy 
3.1 ORANI-NZ 
3.1.1 Model framework 
NZIER has developed a CGE model in conjunction with the Centre of Policy 
Studies (COPS), Monash University, Australia. The model is a New Zealand-
specific version of COPS ORANI-G model (the ‘G’ stands for ‘generic’).  The 
ORANI framework has been extensively used in policy analysis in Australia for 
nearly two decades, and has been adapted for countries all over the world, 
including China, Brazil, Ireland and Denmark (COPS, 2008).  We provide below 
a description of some of the key model features, however the interested reader is 
directed to the COPS website (http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/oranig.htm) for 
full documentation of the ORANI-G model. 
 










Source:  Horridge, 2008;  
 
3.1.2 Comparative-static modelling 
The ORANI model is a static CGE model, designed for comparative-static 
simulations.  ORANI simulation results report the comparative position of the 
economy after some shock, compared to what might have otherwise been.  Figure 
3 illustrates an example, plotting employment with and without the 
implementation of a given policy.  Without the policy, employment reaches point 
with policy 
without policy  
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B after T years.  With the policy, employment reaches point C after T years.  In 
such a simulation, ORANI would report a percentage change in employment of 
100*(B-C)/B (Horridge, 2008).      
3.1.3 Using models 
There are some important caveats that need to be considered with CGE modelling 
in general:   
•  Based on neoclassical microeconomics – this presumes all markets base 
decisions on relative prices.   
•  Smooth responsiveness – the model does not capture step-wise industry and 
economy-wide adjustments but assumes smooth and continuous changes.  In 
reality, industries with large capital resources face discrete production and 
investment decisions.        
•  Aggregation bias – the model aggregates the economy into 131 industries and 
210 commodities; we suggest that this level of detail is sufficient to capture the 
key economic issues across the economy, however note that some effects 
cannot be identified due to aggregation-bias.   
•  Database dependency – the model status-quo structure is based on the snapshot 
of the economy provided by Statistics NZ in their latest 2003 Supply and Use 
Tables, in turn an update on previous more comprehensive input-output tables 
from 1995/96.  Structural changes to the economy over the last 5 years are 
therefore not captured in the model database.  We acknowledge these issues, 
and highlight the need for more regular release of input-output tables to 
enhance policy analysis in NZ.   
•  Comparative static equilibrium analysis – the model reports the likely change 
in the economy at a given time; it does not capture the gradual implementation 
effects of a shock as the economy adjusts over time.  In the long run, these 
restrictions aren’t important as we assume that the economy can adjust to the 
desired point.  A dynamic model would address some of these concerns, and is 
a priority for further work.  
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4. Scenarios 
To evaluate the proposed ETS we conduct two kinds of modelling simulations. 
One simulating the impact of the proposed ETS and a second set of simulations 
evaluating the cost from NZ Government tax paying directly for emissions 
reductions without any form of carbon charge or carbon taxation.   
The baseline against which these simulations are created is a hypothetical world 
without any international obligation to reduce emissions.  This approach allows 
comparison of the two different kinds of simulations. The fact that our baseline is 
hypothetical does not alter the conclusions or robustness of our analysis.  
We evaluate the impacts of an emissions trading scheme in the context of a world 
in which world prices for New Zealand exports do not change to compensate our 
exporters for the increased cost of producing in New Zealand due to an ETS. This 
is a scenario rather than a forecast of what other countries will do to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions but we think it is realistic, especially in the near term. 
New Zealand’s industries most at risk from loss of competitiveness under the 
proposed ETS are agricultural industries. Exports of agricultural products make 
up around half of New Zealand’s merchandise exports. It is highly unlikely that 
other countries will place obligations on their agricultural sectors. Indeed most 
agricultural exports in the world come from countries that subsidise and protect 
agricultural production.
6 It is hard to envisage, therefore, a situation arising where 
world prices for New Zealand’s major exports reflect the cost of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
We refer to our second set of simulations, where we model the impact on the 
economy of the New Zealand Government paying for emission, as ‘NZ pays’. 
Instead of imposing the cost of emissions on industry, the government pays a 
“Kyoto obligation” through raising general taxation. As such, all New Zealand tax 
payers fund emission reductions – hence the use of the phrase ‘NZ pays’, because 
the cost of emissions reductions is distributed across New Zealand tax payers.  
The ‘NZ pays’ scenario has many proponents, who argue that global uncertainty 
of carbon prices, lack of corresponding action from other countries (particularly in 
agriculture), together with NZ’s already high renewable energy levels and world 
class emissions intensity production technologies, means that leading the world in 
introducing a broad-based ETS may be a high-risk and costly strategy for the NZ 
economy.      
In our ‘NZ Pays’ simulations we assume that it does so by paying for emission 
reductions abroad. This is an extreme case because the Government could also 
pay for any emission reductions at home which are lower cost than emission 
reductions abroad. This would lower the cost of any external liability. That being 
                                                 
6  WTO trade statistics for 2006 show that more than half of world trade in agricultural products came from 
the US (16%) and Europe (46%).   
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so, our simulations of the cost of paying for offshore reductions overstates the cost 
of the Government paying for emission reductions.  
Our simulations in which the Government covers any international obligations to 
reduce emissions also overstates the cost to Government by assuming that 
Government will have to pay the same price for emission reductions as firms will 
have to pay. In reality with considerable purchasing power and the ability to seek 
out the low cost emission reduction projects we would expect the Government to 
pay less per tonne of CO2-e than many firms would have to pay. 
4.1 ETS  scenarios 
We have broken down our evaluation of the impacts of an ETS into three time 
periods: 
•  The impact in 2012 
•  The impact in 2015 
•  The impact in 2025 
We model these scenarios by changing the structural parameters of the model to 
reflect the key factors we expect to be at work during the year in question. The 
first point in time (2012) deals with the short term adjustment costs of an ETS. At 
this time emissions obligations are placed on: 
•  Liquid fuels 
•  Stationary energy 
•  Industrial processes 
Firms with obligations who are trade exposed receive a free allocation of permits 
equal to 90% of the 2005 emissions and these allocations include rebates for 
increased electricity prices.  
The second scenario considers the impact on the economy in 2015 of the 
extension of the ETS to agriculture while some free allocation of carbon permits 
remains for trade exposed firms.  In 2015 the ETS will place obligations on: 
•  Liquid fuels 
•  Stationary energy 
•  Industrial processes 
•  Agriculture 
•  Waste industry 
The third scenario considers the impact on the economy in 2025 once free 
allocation has been phased out. The extent of industry obligations remains the 
same as in the second scenario.  
In each of these scenarios we make different assumptions about: 
•  The way that the shocks flow through the economy.  
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•  The extent of free allocation of permits to trade exposed industries. 
•  Growth in the economy if there was no ETS. 
•  Future New Zealand liabilities in international environmental agreements.  
•  The extent of deforestation. 
•  New Zealand’s baseline emissions in the absence of an ETS.   
Below we outline our assumptions.  
4.2  The way shocks flow through the economy 
To analyse the impacts of an emissions trading scheme or in fact any new 
influence or “shock” to the NZ economy we need to decide which parts of the 
economy are likely to adjust over time.  
We need to do that because some parts of an economy need quite some time to 
adjust to new influences. For example, businesses do not tend to close or spring 
up over night. Owners and operators need some time to adjust their businesses to 
any new influences in the economy. As such, we impose our judgement about 
what parts of the economy can and cannot move or adjust  in the short term or the 
long term.  
In terms of short term adjustment in the economy over say two to four years we 
would expect the amount of capital – plant, machinery, equipment and the like – 
to be fixed or at least relatively inflexible and not to adjust too much. 
In reality, businesses do shut down and capital can be destroyed in the short term. 
Our assumption that capital is fixed in the short term means that our results 
understate impacts on capital.  
In the labour market we would expect wages to be inflexible – a phenomenon 
referred to as “sticky wages” where wages do not adjust very quickly downwards 
to new economic influences or shocks.   
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Figure 4 Adjustment in the economy over the short term 
 
Source:  NZIER, Centre for Policy Studies Monash University 
 
With wages and capital fixed in the short term the only things on the production 
side of the NZ economy that can adjust to help the economy respond to new 
influences are employment and the rates of return on capital. 
On the demand side of the economy government spending, private spending (or 
consumption), and investment all maintain fixed shares of total demand in the 
economy while the trade balance adjusts to shocks.  
In the longer term, we would expect most of the short term inflexibilities to 
disappear. Declining rates of return on capital in the short term, for instance, will 
cause adjustments in the size and composition of the capital stock in New 
Zealand. That adjustment will take place to the point that returns on capital return 
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Figure 5 Adjustment in the economy over the longer term 
 
Source:  NZIER, Centre for Policy Studies Monash University 
 
Conversely, the level of employment in the NZ economy will not adjust over the 
longer term. Rather, real wages adjust to ensure that as many people are employed 
as possible.  
On the demand side of the economy the external balance will return to a fixed 
long run or sustainable position through changes in real exchange rates and 
changes in investment flows into and out of New Zealand. As opposed to, in the 
short term, when the trade balance can get larger or smaller much as we see 
happening in any given year.  
In the longer term, investment demand will adjust to reflect the necessary amount 
of investment to maintain or meet the adjusted value of capital in the economy. 
Government and private sector spending (or demand) then adjusts depending on 
what happens to overall activity in the economy (i.e. GDP). 
In both the short and the long run we would not expect adjustments in the 
Government’s fiscal balance – i.e. the balance of what the government spends 
versus the money it receives. This assumption means we can avoid having to 
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These assumptions have an important impact on the outcome of our modelling. 
Our analysis will show a shock having bigger impacts on the economy than if, for 
instance, we assumed that the shock would have no real impact on the amount of 
productive resources available in the economy.  
For example, one research report on the economic impact of the ETS 
commissioned by the Government (Infometrics, 2007) assumed that even over the 
longer term there could not be any negative impact on the amount of capital in the 
New Zealand economy. We take the opposite view. 
In our analysis we assume that in 2012 the “shock” from the ETS flows through 
the economy as a short term shock – as described above. 
In both our 2015 and 2025 scenarios we use our view of the way the economy 
adjusts over the longer term to account for the flow through impacts of the ETS.  
It is not clear whether it is better to take a short or a long term view about 
adjustment when considering the impacts in 2015.  There may not be sufficient 
time between 2008 and 2015 for the labour market to entirely adjust to the 
impacts of the ETS – i.e. to ensure the work force is fully utilised. At the same 
time, we would expect some adjustment to inflation adjusted wages and we do not 
want to overstate the impacts on employment by adopting a short term adjustment 
scenario.  
Similarly, while we would expect some adjustment in the amount of capital 
available after 7 years, that impact may be more muted than our scenario admits.  
To resolve this uncertainty one approach could have been to consider only the 
shorter term (2012) and long term (2025) impacts of the ETS. The problem with 
only having two scenarios to consider is that we would not be able to capture the 
extent to which free allocation of permits helps to mute some of the impacts of the 
ETS on the overall economy.
7  Therefore we decided to include a 2015 scenario in 
order to help show the extent to which free allocation helps to minimise the 
impact of the ETS on the economy.  
The 2015 scenario should be compared to the 2025 scenario and be interpreted as 
showing how free allocation of permits can minimise the impact of the ETS on the 
economy.    
4.3  Rate of growth in emissions 
To determine the size of any emissions reductions under the ETS, and to evaluate 
the size of any free permit allocations, we need to consider baseline forecasts of 
                                                 
7  While we can capture this by considering a scenario with no free allocation in 2012, this would not include 
the effect of free allocation to agriculture, which is not brought into the ETS until 2013.   
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the quantity of emissions in New Zealand between now and 2025. To do this we 
have used forecasts of emissions from the Ministry for the Environment.
8  
 
Figure 6 Forecast growth in emissions 
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Source:  NZIER, Ministry for the Environment 
 
Forecast total growth in emissions is shown in Figure 6. Note that the increase (in 
mega tonnes of CO2-e) over 1990 emissions charted as a dashed line shows 
growth in New Zealand’s Kyoto liability between 2008 and 2012 and the extent of 
any liability that might be imposed in the future in relation to 1990 emissions.  
The Ministry for the Environment forecasts also provide a breakdown of 
emissions by major emitting source (see Figure 7). Those forecasts show a large 
increase in contributions to emissions from forest harvesting in 2025 (see 
afforestation in Figure 7) due to cycles inherent in harvesting but limited increases 
in emissions from deforestation over the entire forecast period.  
We have assumed that the ETS will not have any further impact on deforestation 
beyond what is assumed in the MfE forecasts, i.e. 3 mega tonnes of emissions 
from deforestation on average between 2012 and 2025. This assumption is useful 
for this report as it means our approach is comparable to the approach used in the 
Infometrics (2007) evaluation of the impact of an ETS. In future reports we will 
give more attention to our own assessment of the likely impacts of an ETS on 
New Zealand forests and deforestation.  
                                                 
8  We have adjusted the forecast information we received from the Ministry for the Environment to account 
for the fact that the figures we received did not incorporate reduced deforestation of pre 1990 forests. That 
reduction is in the “Projected balance of emissions units during the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol” (Ministry for the Environment, 2005) so we have used the reduction to ensure consistency with 
the “official” calculation of New Zealand’s Kyoto liability in the first commitment period.   
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Figure 7 Forecast emissions by source 


















Source:  Ministry for the Environment, NZIER 
 
4.4   Allocation  of  permits 
The details of how permits will be allocated under an ETS are not clear so we 
have made some assumptions about this. Our assumptions cover: 
•  which industries will receive free allocations 
•  the rate at which free allocations for indirect emissions from electricity will be 
calculated 
•  the proportion of emissions by industry that will receive free allocation. 
As a starting point we assume that free allocation of permits will be capped within 
an envelope of 90% of 2005 emissions. All other permits will have to be bought.  
We have identified the following sectors as ones that are likely to receive free 
allocations of permits: 
•  Agriculture (livestock emissions)
9 
•  Petroleum refining 
•  Meat and dairy processing 
•  Pulp and paper 
•  Industrial chemicals (including fertiliser) 
•  Non-metallic mineral products (cement and lime) 
•  Basic metals (iron and steel and aluminium) 
•  Wood processing. 
                                                 
9  Not applicable until agriculture assumes obligations under the ETS in 2013.   
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Our choice of sectors was guided by the Climate Change Bill, our judgement 
about trade exposed sectors, and by those sectors identified as receiving free 
allocation in the modelling work undertaken for Government (Infometrics, 2007).  
The proportion of direct emissions that is allocated freely was informed by the 
Ministry for the Environment’s forecasts of emissions by industry.  
Where emission forecasts for a specific sector were not available we have 
calculated their free allocation based on the average across industrial processes.  
In the case of free allocations of permits or receipt of rebates to cover increased 
electricity costs (i.e. indirect emissions), we have calculated this on the basis of 
2005 electricity consumption by industry and on the assumption that the marginal 
emission factor in electricity is 0.6 times the increase in cost from the marginal 
emitting technology (assumed here to be coal, so ignoring the existence of the 
Government owned diesel generator at Whirinaki because the plant is only reserve 
capacity and is not supposed to generate very often).  
4.5  Baseline economic forecasts 
Baseline economic forecasts that we will use later to gauge the dollar impacts of 
the ETS are summarised in Table 1. These forecasts are mainly based on trend 
growth analysis of the New Zealand economy, with an assumption that the NZ 
economy will continue to grow at around the same trend rates over the next ten to 
twenty years as it has in the past fifteen years. The only exception to this is that 
we have drawn on Statistics New Zealand’s population projections to produce our 
forecasts of population growth and growth in the number of households in New 
Zealand.  
 
Table 1 Baseline economic forecasts 
Dollar millions unless otherwise stated 
  2012 2015 2025 
GDP 215,730  263,260  412,053 
Real GDP (2008 prices)  196,939  222,027  290,786 
Private consumption   125,690  153,827  242,341 
Real private consumption (2008 prices)  121,493  139,558  190,639 
Number of households  1,575,300  1,642,479  1,804,294 
Employment (full time equivalent employees)  2,278,503  2,350,997  2,609,718 
Payments to employees (2008 prices)  91,489  107,232  153,273 
Source: NZIER 
 
4.6 International  action 
To make an assessment of the economic impacts of the ETS after 2012 we have 
made assumptions about the nature of any successor arrangement to the first 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. We assume, for simplicity, that the  
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parameters of New Zealand’s international obligations between 2012 and 2025 are 
the same as those between 2008 and 2012 – i.e. we assume that New Zealand 
must either reduce its emissions to 1990 levels or pay to offset the difference 
between its emissions and 1990 emissions at prevailing international prices.  
We acknowledge that an ETS could continue to operate even if there is not a 
successor arrangement after the end of the first commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Therefore it may be worthwhile considering what the impact of 
an ETS might be without any further international commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. We have decided, however, to leave such an analysis 
to one side for the moment because if there is no further coordinated international 
commitment to reduce greenhouse gases, then having an ETS in New Zealand 
would be futile. New Zealand is just too small a contributor to global greenhouse 
gas emissions for us to have an impact on climate change on our own.  
To conduct our analysis of the effects of an ETS we also assume in our base case 
that New Zealand’s comprehensive ETS (all gases and all sectors) is not matched 
by equivalent schemes elsewhere in the world. This is clearly a simplification 
although to date very few countries have introduced an ETS and no other country 
has initiated an ETS that is as comprehensive as the proposed NZ scheme.  
Our assumption has one main practical impact. That is that, in the absence of 
equivalent schemes elsewhere in the world (especially schemes incorporating 
agriculture), New Zealand’s trade exposed industries will be at a competitive 
disadvantage in world markets. As a result exports come under pressure.  
By assuming that no equivalent schemes are introduced elsewhere in the world we 
can also usefully evaluate the consequences of New Zealand forging ahead with 
an ETS while other countries adopt different strategies. This gives an entry point 
into understanding the extent of “burden sharing” under any future international 
arrangements.  
4.7 Prices 
All of our scenarios are based on an assumed international price of carbon 
equivalent to $40 per tonne of CO2-e in 2008 prices. 
There is considerable uncertainty about what carbon prices will be in future. We 
have chosen NZ$40 as it reflects our view of the likely price for project based 
credits in 2012.  
At the moment there are several prices for carbon around the world and most 
likely there will not be any one price for NZUs in an NZ ETS.  
One indicator of future prices for NZUs is the price of European Union (EU) 
allowances in the EU ETS. Prices for EU allowances (EUAs) traded on the 
European climate exchange have averaged around 21 euros per tonne of CO2 in 
the past two years (see Figure 8).   
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As the second phase of the EU ETS continues and firms need to find allowances 
to meet their credits, it is likely that EUA prices will rise. One influential 
commentator in Europe, Henrik Hasselknippe, Director of emissions trading 
analysis at Point Carbon, has suggested that carbon prices in the European ETS 




Figure 8 EU allowance prices 
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Source:  European Climate Exchange 
 
The price of EUAs in Europe is, however, only an indicator of a likely upper 
bound on the price of NZUs. The EU ETS has restrictions on the offsets that are 
able to be used to meet obligations under their ETS and on the use of carbon 
credits from outside the EU. For these reasons, the ECX EUA price is likely to be 
above what the price would be if there was a truly global market covering most 
carbon emissions.  
An alternative indicator is the value of Certified Emission Reduction units 
(CERs). These are credits arising from projects in developing countries that lead 
to reduced emissions. Such credits have highly variable prices reflecting different 
risks around the delivery of emission reductions associated with these credits.
11 In 
a survey of CER prices in 2006 the World Bank found that prices for CERs 
ranged from USD$7 for CERs where buyers carried much of the delivery risk – 
i.e. the risk that the projects would result in emission reductions that could be use 
to offset a buyers emissions – to US$27 for some credits in secondary markets 
which carried very little or no risk to the purchaser. 
                                                 
10   The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/03/carbonemissions.climatechange , April 
3 2008 
11    For an excellent summary of the issues around CERs and the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) from which they arise see Carr, C. and Rosembuj, F. (2008) “Flexible mechanisms for climate 
change compliance: emission offset purchases under the clean development mechanism” available at   
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=DocLib&CatalogID=38443.   
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Our view is that a reasonable estimate of prices for NZUs should put most weight 
on secondary market CER prices. While primary market CERs have previously 
traded at much lower prices than secondary market CERs, this in part reflects 
considerable differences in contracts and risks that purchasers take on. There are 
considerable transaction costs in finding and administering CDM projects in 
primary markets. Furthermore, accessing primary credits is likely to be too risky 
or costly for many NZ firms, which are small by world standards. Primary market 
credits are most likely to be sourced and put into portfolios by carbon funds who 
can then sell on those credits into secondary market products that carry less risk 
than the primary market credits but which are much higher in price than primary 
CERs.   
We would also expect the price of CERs to rise over time. This is because the first 
projects that are exploited are typically lower cost projects. As these low cost 
opportunities to create offsets are exhausted there will be upward pressure on 
prices. Quite what the extent of that upward pressure might be is too difficult to 
say.
12  
To establish a price to use in our scenarios we settled on considering forward 
contract prices for EUAs and forward contract prices for CERs on the European 
climate exchange. 
In our view it makes sense to include EUAs in our calculation because it is likely 
that some gap or premium will exist between spot market NZUs and project based 
credits.  
We looked at forward contracts for delivery of CERs and EUAs in 2012, from 
prices struck in the first quarter of 2008: 
•  EUAs for December 2012 delivery averaged 24.5 euros per tonne of CO2. 
•  CERs for December 2012 settlement averaged 16 euros per tonne of CO2.  
We chose the mid point between the two – 20 euros – as our central estimate of 
the price of NZUs in an NZ ETS. To convert this into an NZ dollar value we used 
our view of the medium to long term value of the NZ dollar against the euro, 0.5 
euro per NZ dollar.
13 
                                                 
12   Emission reductions are like natural resources and as we would expect prices to grow much as they do for 
other natural resources as the resource is exploited or extracted. See Hotelling, H (1931) “The Economics 
of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal of Political Economy, April 1931, 39, pp. 137-175. Of course, the size 
of the emission reduction opportunities available for use depends on technology and government regulation 
and this makes it very difficult to gauge the magnitude of upward pressure on prices.  
13 The Euro traded at 0.52 Euro per NZ dollar during March 2008.   
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5. Results 
5.1  Impact of the ETS in 2012 
 
Table 2 Impacts on the economy, 2012 
  ETS NZ  pays  Difference 
GDP (% change)  -0.5  -0.1  -0.4 
Change in GDP ($m, 2008 prices)  -908  -107  -801 
Private consumption (% change)  -0.8  -0.5  -0.4 
Change in private consumption ($m, 2008 prices)  -951  -522  -430 
Change in private consumption per household ($, 
2008  prices)  -604 -331 -273 
Domestic government spending (% change)  -0.8  -0.5  0.4 
Investment (% change)  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Employment (% change)  -1.0  -0.1  -0.9 
Employment change (Full time equivalents)  -22,193  -1,467  -20,726 
Average inflation adjusted wages (% change)  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Change in average inflation adjusted wages ($ per 
ordinary  hour)  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Payments to owners of productive land (% change)  -1.5  1.1  -2.6 
Payments to owners of capital (% change)  -1.7  -1.0  -0.8 
Exports (% change in quantities)  0.0  0.7  -0.6 
Export prices (% change)  0.0  -0.2  0.2 
Domestic prices (% change)  0.1  -0.8  0.9 
Imports (% change in quantities)  -0.6  -0.3  -0.2 
Inflation adjusted (real) exchange rate (% change)  0.0  -0.8  0.8 
Kyoto liability payment ($m, 2008 prices)  299  375  -75 
Domestic emissions (% change)  -2.6  0.0  -2.6 
Change in emissions (kilotonnes of CO2-e) -1,826  0  -1,826 
Leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e)  56 0 56 
Change in domestic emissions net of leakage 
(kilotonnes of CO2-e) -1,770  0  -1,770 
Total reduction in global CO2-e (net of leakage)  -9,315  -9,371  56 
Notes:  (1)  Rows may not sum due to rounding. 
Source: NZIER 
 
In this scenario the Government introduces an ETS as currently proposed with: 
•   obligations on liquid fuels, stationary energy, and industrial processes  
•  allocation of emission permits is free up to 90% of 2005 emissions to industrial 
processes – direct and indirect emissions from electricity use 
•  the price of carbon is assumed to be, on average, NZ$40 per tonne of CO2-e   
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•  New Zealand’s target Kyoto compliance is a 15% reduction in emissions – 
reduce or pay for reductions elsewhere in the world. 
The overall impact of the ETS and the Government’s offshore payment to cover 
New Zealand’s Kyoto liability is a 0.5% reduction in GDP. Most of the impact 
falls on the production or income side of the economy with changes in returns to 
capital of -1.7%.   
There is a reduction in employment of 1.0% or approximately 22,000 jobs, based 
on our forecast of what employment would otherwise be  (see Table 1).  
Note that this reduction does not necessarily mean that workers are laid off; rather 
it is more likely that 22,000 jobs will just not be created.  
Inflation adjusted household consumption, declines by 0.8% as a result of reduced 
household incomes (through reduced employment and lower returns to capital) 
and reduced purchasing power from higher prices. In 2008 prices that equates to 
around $600 less spending per household in 2012. Of course, this impact is an 
average and this figure will be higher for some households and lower for others.  
These results compare with much smaller impacts on the economy if the 
Government pays New Zealand’s Kyoto Liability and does not introduce an ETS 
– thereby spreading the cost across the New Zealand economy. With an ETS in 
place the impact on GDP is eight times larger than under an ‘NZ pays’ scenario. 
Under an ETS the impact on GDP equates to $908 million in 2008 prices. When 
‘NZ pays’ the impact is a reduction of only $107 million.  
Under the ‘NZ Pays’ scenario, the impact on GDP is less than the cost of New 
Zealand’s Kyoto Liability ($375 million in 2012). This is because the 
Government’s offshore payment reduces domestic demand but does not impact 
directly on the productive capacity of the economy.   
Faced with reduced domestic demand, many firms increase the share of product 
that they send offshore. Of course, in order to do this firms have to accept lower 
returns and this is reflected in a depreciation in the inflation adjusted value of the 
New Zealand dollar. 
Under an ETS the reduction in employment in 2012 is more than ten times larger 
than without  - although the extent of this difference is masked a little in Table 2 
because we have rounded our results up to the first decimal place for 
presentational purposes.    
There is also a small difference between global emission reductions under an ETS 
and without. Under an ETS there is a -1,826 kt CO2-e reduction in emissions 
domestically, leaving a further reduction of -7,545 kt CO2-e to be paid for from 
reductions elsewhere in the world. This leads to a gross reduction in emissions of 
9,371 kt CO2-e. There is, however, a small amount of “leakage”, whereby New 
Zealand production is displaced by production elsewhere in the world. This  
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displacement amounts to approximately 56 kt. Thus the net reduction in global 
emissions under an ETS in 2012 is 9,315 kt CO2-e.  
In the case of no ETS, New Zealand still pays for a liability equal to 9,371 kt of 
CO2-e in 2012.  
5.1.1 Industry impacts 
Table 3 provides a break down of impacts of the ETS by industry. Industries that 
are impacted most in the short term are those that serve domestic markets and 
those that use or produce a lot of fossil and liquid fuels.  
Petroleum refining is impacted more than any other industry. Activity declines by 
4.0% in 2012 compared with what it would otherwise have been. This is due to 
declining demand for petroleum products and, to a lesser extent, a loss of 
domestic market share for its products due to increased costs relative to imported 
alternatives. While we assume the industry receives free allocation for all of its 
process emissions (those produced as a by-product of the manufacturing process), 
the industry still faces general cost increases which reduce its competitiveness 
relative to overseas petroleum refining and manufacturing industries.  
The rate of return on capital in the petroleum refining industry declines 30% in 
2012. Impacts on returns to capital are larger across all industries than impacts on 
employment or impacts on overall activity levels. This is because capital stocks 
are assumed to remain fixed in the short term. In effect, we assume that as long as 
firms can find a market for their products (i.e. sufficient demand), they will 
continue to produce using as much of their available plant and equipment as they 
can. If demand does reduce, firms can, to a limited extent, scale back production 
and costs by hiring fewer employees. By our assumption, they cannot scale back 
on their capital and that means that returns on capital will reduce. 
We are also, in effect, assuming that firms will accept any reductions in returns 
capital and will not exit the market or relocate their production offshore in the 
short term. This is a simplification and in reality there is a risk that some firms 
will not accept reduced returns and will exit the market.  
Other industries that are heavily impacted by the ETS in 2012 include the 
transport services industry - incorporating domestic freight and air transport 
services – mining and quarrying, and electricity and gas supply industries.     
Mining and quarrying is most impacted by reduced demand for coal from the 
electricity industry.
14 Some of that reduced demand is offset by a large increase in 
quantities of coal exports but declining domestic demand and falling export 
returns mean an overall decline in mining activity.  
                                                 
14 This result ignores issues such as supply contracts which might lessen the actual reduction in coal fired 
electricity generation.  In our model, coal fired electricity generation declines 22% compared to what it 
otherwise would have been.   
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Table 3 Industry impacts, 2012 
Percent change.  
  Contribution to GDP  Employment  Rental price of capital 
Horticulture and fruit growing  -0.1  -0.3  -0.5 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -0.2  -0.8  -1.5 
Dairy farming  0.0  -0.5  -0.8 
Other farming  -0.1  -0.8  -1.6 
Services to primary industry  -0.3  -0.6  -1.1 
Forestry and logging  0.0  -0.3  -1.0 
Fishing -0.8  -3.5  -6.7 
Mining and quarrying  -1.2  -4.1  -7.6 
Oil and gas exploration and extraction  0.0  -0.6  -1.1 
Meat processing  -0.2 -0.4  -0.6 
Dairy product manufacturing  0.0 -0.1  0.0 
Other food and beverage manufacturing  -0.3  -0.8  -1.3 
Textiles clothing and footwear  -0.3  -0.6  -1.1 
Timber and wood products  0.0 0.0  0.1 
Paper & paper product manufacturing  0.2 0.7  1.6 
Printing and publishing  -0.3  -0.6  -1.0 
Petroleum product refining and manufacturing  -4.0 -14.0 -30.3 
Fertiliser manufacturing  -0.1 -0.6  -1.0 
Cement and other non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing  -0.2 -0.7  -1.3 
Basic metal manufacturing  0.1 0.3  0.6 
Other manufacturing  -0.2  -0.4  -0.7 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  -1.5  -7.8  -15.9 
Property and construction services  -0.1  -0.3  -0.5 
Transport services  -1.2  -2.8  -4.9 
Business services  -0.3  -0.9  -1.9 
Government and personal services  -0.7  -1.0  -2.6 
Other services  -0.3  -0.9  -1.7 
 
Notes:  (1)  Rental price of capital is equivalent to the average return to capital per unit of capital.  
(2)  Change in contribution to GDP is equal to the change in an industry’s “value added”. 




Other industries that contract are typically ones where their activity is linked 
closely to the fortunes of the domestic economy and increases or decreases in 
domestic demand. Business services industries are one example.   
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In the short term, impacts on industry are also influenced heavily by the extent of 
any free allocation of permits. Indeed in some cases, free allocation more than 
offsets any loss in competitiveness that would otherwise have occurred. 
Table 3 shows increased economic activity and employment in some industries 
receiving free allocation. Those increases in activity are due to free allocations for 
indirect emissions from electricity use.  
To be clear, that result comes primarily from our assumption about the value of 
free allocations that firms will receive and the value of those allocations relative to 
increases in electricity prices. Industries that use a lot of electricity will receive 
some relief from rising input costs, while other firms facing cost increases will not 
receive any free allocation of rebates to offset their cost increases. One example is 
the fishing industry, where activity declines 0.8% and employment declines 3.5% 
in 2012.    
 
Figure 9 Distribution of impacts on industry 














In addition, there is of course a degree of aggregation bias in our results. In the 
case of the pulp and paper industry, the result showing an increase in activity 
disguises the fact that mechanical pulp manufacturing will face larger cost 
increases than manufacturers using chemical pulping processes.  
Similarly, the results for basic metals manufacturing conflate the results for 
aluminium production and steel production.     
A comparison of the distribution of impacts by industry if ‘NZ pays’ for New 
Zealand Kyoto liability and there is no ETS versus if there is an ETS, is shown in 
Figure 9.
15 That shows the extent to which an ETS means many more industries 
                                                 
15 Large negative impacts on the refining industry and coal fired electricity generation have been removed 
from the chart so that the distribution of impacts can be discerned. If left in the analysis, it is too difficult to 
see the relative distributional impacts between the ‘NZ pays’ versus ETS scenarios.    
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will contract and that the distribution of the impacts will be felt heavily by a 
handful of firms compared with a relatively even distribution of impacts without 
an ETS. 
5.2  Medium term impacts with free allocation 
 
Table 4 Impacts on the economy, 2015 
 
  ETS NZ  pays  Difference 
GDP (% change)  -0.9  -0.1  -0.8 
Change in GDP ($m, 2008 prices)  -1,996  -191  -1,805 
Private consumption (% change)  -0.8  -0.4  -0.4 
Change in private consumption ($m, 2008 prices)  -1,001  -471  -530 
Change in private consumption per household ($, 
2008  prices)  -610 -287 -323 
Domestic government spending (% change)  -0.8  -0.4  0.4 
Investment (% change)  -1.5  -0.1  -1.4 
Employment (% change)  0 by assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Employment change (Full time equivalents)  0 by assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Average inflation adjusted wages (% change)  -3.6  -0.2  -3.4 
Change in average inflation adjusted wages ($ per 
ordinary  hour)  -0.9 -0.1 -0.9 
Payments to owners of productive land (% change)  -8.8  0.5  -9.3 
Payments to owners of capital (% change)  -1.1  -0.3  -0.9 
Exports (% change in quantities)  -1.3  0.5  -1.8 
Export prices (% change)  0.3  -0.1  0.4 
Domestic prices (% change)  0.4  -0.2  0.6 
Imports (% change in quantities)  -1.4  -0.2  -1.2 
Inflation adjusted (real) exchange rate (% change)  0.0  -0.2  0.3 
Kyoto liability payment ($m, 2008 prices)  149  328  -199 
Domestic emissions (% change)  -6.4  0.0  -6.4 
Change in emissions (kilotonnes of CO2-e) -4,480  0  -4,480 
Leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e)  930 0 930 
Change in domestic emissions net of leakage 
(kilotonnes of CO2-e) -3,550  0  -3,550 
Total reduction in global CO2-e (net of leakage)  -7,269  -8,199  930 
Notes:  (1)  Rows may not sum due to rounding.  
Source: NZIER 
 
In this scenario the Government introduces an ETS as currently proposed with: 
•  obligations on liquid fuels, stationary energy, industrial processes, agriculture, 
and emissions from the waste industry.  
•  allocation of emission permits is free up to 90% of 2005 emissions to industrial 
processes – direct and indirect emissions from electricity use – and agriculture.  
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•  the price of carbon is assumed to be, on average, NZ$40 per tonne of CO2-e.  
•  New Zealand’s target Kyoto compliance is a 13% reduction in emissions – 
reduce or pay for reductions elsewhere in the world. 
The impact of the ETS on GDP roughly doubles between 2012 and 2015 as a 
result of declining free allocations to firms that entered the scheme in 2010 and 
the expansion of the ETS to agriculture. 
The change in GDP due to the ETS in 2015 is a reduction of $1.97 billion in 2008 
prices or (0.9%). This compares with a -0.1% or -$191 million impact if there is 
no ETS and the Government simply pays for New Zealand’s Kyoto liability. That 
is, the impact on the economy is nine times larger under an ETS than without.  
The net effect of economic impacts starts to shift from the domestic economy to 
those parts of the economy that are export focused.  
Increased costs to domestic production have a marked impact on export 
competitiveness and see exports decline -1.3%.  
We assume that employment is not effected, but inflation adjusted wages decline 
by 3.6%, which equates to an average reduction in wage rates of around 90 cents 
an hour in 2008 prices (based on an average hourly wage of $23.10 per hour in 
2012 at 2008 prices).  
The impact on emissions is much higher once free allocations start to phase out 
and agriculture is introduced into the ETS. In 2015 domestic emissions reduce by 
-6.2% or approximately 4,500 kt CO2-e. This reduces the amount of money that is 
transferred offshore to reduce NZ emissions to (by assumption) 1990 levels. In 
2015 $149 million is transferred offshore to pay for reductions elsewhere in the 
world, equating to approximately 3,719 kt CO2-e reduced at NZ$40 per tonne.  
That yields a gross reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions of around 8,199 
kt of CO2-e.  
Around 20% (930 kt) of the domestic reduction is, however, due to New Zealand 
production being displaced by overseas production. As such the actual reduction 
in global emissions is 7,269 kt CO2-e. This compares against a global emissions 
reduction of 8,199 kt CO2-e when there is no ETS. That is, without an ETS New 
Zealand’s contribution to global emission reductions is 13% larger than with an 
ETS.  
5.2.1 Industry impacts 
In 2015 most of the negative impacts of the ETS fall on New Zealand’s export 
industries.   
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Table 5 Industry impacts, 2015 
Percent change. 
  Contribution to GDP  Employment  Capital stock 
Horticulture and fruit growing  0.9  2.3  0.3 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -3.2  -4.6  -5.9 
Dairy farming  -5.3  -8.5  -9.8 
Other farming  -0.6  0.3  -1.5 
Services to primary industry  -1.5  -0.7  -2.2 
Forestry and logging  0.0  1.5  -0.3 
Fishing -2.1  -2.6  -4.0 
Mining and quarrying  -3.1  -4.1  -5.4 
Oil and gas exploration and extraction  -0.9  -0.6  -1.8 
Meat processing  -2.9 -2.4  -3.7 
Dairy product manufacturing  -4.8 -4.0  -5.4 
Other food and beverage manufacturing  -0.1  0.6  -0.7 
Textiles clothing and footwear  0.9  1.6  -0.1 
Timber and wood products  -0.1 0.6  -0.8 
Paper & paper product manufacturing  -0.3 0.7  -0.8 
Printing and publishing  0.2  1.0  -0.5 
Petroleum product refining and manufacturing  -12.1 -9.0  -13.1 
Fertiliser manufacturing  -3.4 -2.4  -3.8 
Cement and other non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing  -1.5 -0.5  -1.9 
Basic metal manufacturing  -1.7 -1.0  -2.4 
Other manufacturing  0.2  0.9  -0.5 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  -3.9  -2.8  -4.2 
Property and construction services  -1.1  -0.3  -1.6 
Transport services  -2.4  -1.7  -2.9 
Business services  -0.6  0.3  -1.0 
Government and personal services  -0.4  -0.1  -1.3 
Other services  -0.4  0.4  -0.8 
Notes:  (1)  Change in contribution to GDP is equal to the change in an industry’s “value added”. 
              (2)     Industries receiving some free allocation in underlined italics. 
Source: NZIER 
 
The contribution of pastoral production to GDP declines by between -0.6% and -
5.3%, depending on the type of production. Dairy farming declines most from 
what it otherwise would have been as a result of increases in downstream 
production and processing costs. In addition, more than 90% of dairy products 
produced are exported offshore and this means that the dairy industry faces  
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greater risk to its competitiveness than, say, sheep and beef farming as a whole  
where a larger proportion of product (mainly beef) is sold domestically.
16  
Nonetheless sheep and beef farming contracts 3.2% in 2015. Meat processing also 
declines 2.9% with a  consequent 2.4% reduction in employment in the sector.  
These impacts are despite the fact that free allocation is phased out more slowly 
for agriculture than for other industries.  
For other industries that receive free allocations of emission permits, many who 
have high energy use but relatively low process emissions contract less than 
agricultural industries in 2015. Activity in the basic metals and pulp paper 
industries contract by 1.7% and 0.3% respectively. These results mask different 
impacts on firms within the industry that can only be evaluated with firm level 
modelling. 
Industries with high process emissions whose permit allocations are being phased 
out, contract quite markedly. Activity in the cement manufacturing industry 
contracts 1.5% and activity in the fertiliser industry contracts 3.4% - mainly due 
to reduced domestic demand for their products.  
Activity in the horticulture and fruit growing industries expands in aggregate 
because there is some shifting of resources towards horticulture away from 
relatively more emission intensive livestock production.  
Within horticulture it is pip fruit – apple and pear – production that expands most 
(by around 2.4%). Other types of production fare less well, especially energy 
intensive greenhouse production in horticulture.  
5.3  Longer term impacts of an ETS 
Over the longer term, with all free allocation of emission credits phased out, the 
negative impact on the economy increases to a -2.1% change in GDP with an ETS 
compared with a -0.7% impact without. Those changes equate to a reduction in 
GDP of approximately $5.9 billion (2008 prices) with an ETS compared with $1.4 
billion without an ETS, making the impact of an ETS four times larger than 
without.  
The impact of the ETS is felt most strongly in the productive sector, with a 
reduction in the capital stock of 4.0% and a reduction in returns to productive land 
of 14.8%.  
With an ETS in place real wages decline 6.7%. That equates to a reduction in 
average hourly wages of around $2.30 an hour in today’s prices (based on a 
                                                 
16 In most general equilibrium modelling it is assumed that imports are not a perfect substitute for 
domestically produced goods (so called “Armington” assumptions). As such businesses making goods for 
domestic consumption have an implicit advantage over imports in our results.   
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forecast average hourly inflation adjusted wage in 2025 of $33.70) and compares 
to a 1.7% or 60 cent reduction without an ETS.  
 
Table 6 Impacts on the economy, 2025 
 
   ETS NZ  pays  Difference 
GDP (% change)  -2.1  -0.7  -1.4 
Change in GDP ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,971  -1,362  -4,610 
Private consumption (% change)  -3.0  -2.5  -0.5 
Change in private consumption ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,462  -4,472  -989 
Change in private consumption per household ($, 
2008 prices)  -3,027  -2,479  -548 
Domestic government spending (% change)  -3.0  -2.5  -0.5 
Investment (% change)  -3.4  -0.7  -2.7 
Employment (% change)  0 by assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Employment change (Full time equivalents)  0 by assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Average inflation adjusted wages (% change)  -6.7  -1.7  -5.0 
Change in average inflation adjusted wages ($ per 
ordinary  hour)  -2.3 -0.6 -1.7 
Payments to owners of productive land (% change)  -14.8  3.7  -18.5 
Payments to owners of capital (% change)  -4.0  -1.8  -2.1 
Exports (% change in quantities)  0.0  3.3  -3.3 
Export prices (% change)  -0.2  -0.8  0.6 
Domestic prices (% change)  -0.9  -1.2  0.2 
Imports (% change in quantities)  -3.5  -1.5  -2.0 
Inflation adjusted (real) exchange rate (% change)  -1.7  -1.5  -0.2 
Kyoto liability payment ($m, 2008 prices)  1,743  2,231  -488 
Domestic emissions (% change)  -10.4  0  -10.4 
Change in emissions (kilotonnes of CO2-e)  -12,192 0 -12,192 
Leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e) 3,001  0  3,001 
Change in domestic emissions net of leakage 
(kilotonnes of CO2-e) -9,191  0  -9,191 
Total reduction in global CO2-e (net of leakage)  -52,769  -55,770  3,001 
Notes:  (1)  Rows may not sum due to rounding.   
Source: NZIER 
 
Private consumption spending per household in 2025 declines by around $3,000 
per household in 2008 prices, a decline about $500 larger than if there is no ETS. 
In 2025, we expect the economy and New Zealander’s standard of living to be 
much higher than it is today. If historical rates of growth continue we expect GDP 
per capita to increase from around $38,700 at the end of 2007 to around $55,000 
in 2025 after adjusting for inflation. A -2.1% change in GDP would mean a 
reduction in GDP per capita from $55,000 down to $53,845 (a change of -$1,155 
per person).  
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At the same time, Australian GDP per capita in 2007 was $51,650 in Australian 
dollars or $54,450 in New Zealand dollars.
17 So while the New Zealand economy 
will be much bigger in the future it is possible that it will still be smaller than 
Australia’s economy is today.     
5.3.1 Industry impacts 
Over the long term, the industry effects from 2015 are magnified as the free 
allocation has reduced to zero by the end of 2025.  The burden of the ETS falls 
largely on New Zealand’s export sector, with agricultural production particularly 
effected. 
Dairy farming contracts markedly in terms of contribution to GDP, down 12.9%.  
Dairy processing also declines by 11.7% with an associated 10.0% reduction in 
employment.  Sheep and beef farming are similarly affected, down 6.6% on 
contribution to GDP; meat processing is down 5.7% with a consequent reduction 
in employment of 4.4%.  Under an ETS, important industries within the NZ 
economy will be significantly affected.      
As the free allocation is phased out, energy intensive manufacturing industries are 
also significantly affected by the ETS. Activity in basic metal and non-metallic 
mineral product manufacturing reduce contributions to GDP by 5.0% and 3.9% 
respectively.  Fertilizer manufacturing contributions to GDP fall by 7.3%, 
influenced not only by the full impact of the ETS on production costs but by 
reduced domestic demand for their products. Petroleum refining and 
manufacturing is similarly affected as reduced demand for its product see a 
significant 12.5% reduction in contribution to GDP compared to what otherwise 
might have been.   
Much of New Zealand’s farm land loses value as a result of declining profits 
especially in the pastoral sector. The price of dairy land declines by 40.6% and 
sheep and beef farm land reduces in value by 23.4% (see Table 8).  
Industries that benefit relative to others from the impact of the ETS are 
horticulture and fruit growing sectors, and textile manufacturing, effectively 
benefiting from down-turns in other key agricultural and exporting sectors.  
The price of horticultural land and forest land also increases in price as the 
profitability of these sectors (in aggregate) increases relative to other types of 
rural land use.  
 
                                                 
17 Converted using the most recent (2006) OECD purchasing power parities available at the time of writing 
(NZ$:AUS$ 1.0575). OECD (2006) Main Economic Indicators, Volume 2007/11, p.281.   
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Table 7 Industry impacts, 2025 
Percent change compared to what would otherwise have been the case.  
  Contribution to GDP  Employment  Capital stock 
Horticulture and fruit growing  4.9  10.4  4.3 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -6.6  -9.0  -11.9 
Dairy farming  -12.9  -19.8  -22.4 
Other farming  0.1  3.5  -0.7 
Services to primary industry  -2.0  0.0  -3.7 
Forestry and logging  1.7  6.4  2.3 
Fishing 2.4  6.2  2.8 
Mining and quarrying  -3.8  -4.3  -7.3 
Oil and gas exploration and extraction  -1.0  0.5  -2.0 
Meat processing  -5.7  -4.4  -7.4 
Dairy product manufacturing  -11.7  -10.0  -12.9 
Other food and beverage manufacturing  1.4  3.1  0.3 
Textiles clothing and footwear  3.6  5.2  1.5 
Timber and wood products  2.0  3.6  0.3 
Paper & paper product manufacturing  0.7  3.0  -0.3 
Printing and publishing  0.8  2.6  -0.6 
Petroleum product refining and manufacturing  -12.5  -7.8  -14.1 
Fertiliser manufacturing -7.3  -5.0  -8.0 
Cement and other non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing -3.9  -1.7  -4.8 
Basic metal manufacturing  -5.0  -3.4  -6.5 
Other manufacturing  2.0  3.7  0.6 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  -4.9  -2.3  -5.5 
Property and construction services  -3.4  -1.4  -4.4 
Transport services  -1.9  -0.1  -3.2 
Business services  -1.8  0.4  -2.8 
Government and personal services  -2.4  -1.6  -4.3 
Other services  -1.7  0.7  -2.7 
Notes:  (1)  Change in contribution to GDP is equal to the change in an industry’s “value added”. 
Source: NZIER 
 
The tourism industry, which will not face the full cost of its emissions under the 
ETS,  also stands to benefit. Tourism expands by 1.9% because it becomes more 
competitive through reduced wage bills and a depreciation in the value of the New 
Zealand dollar.  
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Table 8 Impact on primary sector land prices, 2025 
Percent change compared to what would otherwise have been the case 
Land use  Price of land 
Horticulture and fruit growing  9.3 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -23.4 
Dairy cattle farming  -40.6 
Other farming  -2.2 
Forestry and logging  5.4 
Mining and quarrying  -15.2 
Source: NZIER 
 
5.4 Regional  impacts 
The burden of the ETS is not equally distributed around the country, just as 
emissions are not equally distributed around the country.
18   
5.4.1 2012 impacts 
 
Figure 10 Impacts on regional GDP, 2012 
% change to what otherwise might have been 





















The initial effects of the implementation of the ETS to 2012 are felt most largely 
in Northland and the West Coast, due to the relatively high proportion of petrol 
refining and coal mining in each region respectively.  Regional GDP is expected 
to fall by 0.6% and 0.5% respectively, compared to what otherwise might be the 
                                                 
18 Our results of the regional impact of the ETS are broadly consistent with NIWA’s  map of NZ emissions 
intensity across TLAs (see http://www.niwa.cri.nz/ncces/projects/ghge )  
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case.  The effects of employment losses in petroleum refining and coal mining 
will also be highly regional.  For example, around 75 of the 850 jobs in the West 
Coast coal mining industry are expected to be lost.
19   
Under an ‘NZ pays’ scenario, the reduction of GDP is expected to be less than 
0.1% across all regions.    
5.4.2 2025 impacts 
 
Figure 11 Impacts on regional GDP, 2025 
% change to what might otherwise have been 





















By 2025, with a broad ETS and no free allocations to industry, Southland and 
Northland are the two most affected regions, with GDP estimated to be 3% and 
2.8% lower than what might otherwise be the case.  Northland continues to be 
affected by petroleum refining, while both regions suffer from relatively high 
shares of agriculture.  For example, around 25% of total employment in Southland 
is in dairy, sheep and beef farming, and associated service and processing 
industries.  In Auckland, the same figure is less than 1% (Statistics New Zealand 
Table Builder, NZIER).  As per the previous section, our modelling predicts 
significant cuts to these industries under an ETS. 
In the government pays scenario, the regional impacts are significantly different.  
The level of impact for all regions is less than under an ETS, while the relative 
burden-sharing also changes.  Wellington and Auckland face a relatively higher 
share of the burden, while Southland bares a relatively much lower share.  This is 
                                                 
19 Total West Coast coal mining employment numbers sourced from 
http://www.gowestcoastnz.com/regional/mining/   
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an unsurprising result, given that the ETS specifically targets emitting industries, 
which are unevenly distributed across NZ, while a government pays scenario uses 
increased taxation from the entire population, to meet the Kyoto obligation. 
5.4.3 Comments on regional impacts 
We acknowledge the ‘polluter pays’ principle that underlines the ETS, and the 
subsequent outcome that relatively high-emitting regions will face a relatively 
high share of  the burden.  However we point out that such large burdens on 
regional areas may have significant repercussions.  For example, the impact of the 
ETS on agriculture and related services and processing in Southland could result 
in employment reductions of around 1000 jobs at a carbon price of $40.
20  There 
will also be further induced or downstream effects that such large cuts in 
employment would be likely to have on a local economy the size of Southland.   
Similarly, MAF have reported impacts of the ETS on profitability of a standard 
beef and sheep farm to be -80.3% at $25 carbon price, and -160.5% at $50 (MAF, 
2008).  Such loses in profitability will also fall disproportionately on regions such 
as Southland.   
                                                 
20 Assuming industry employment shares follow trends of the last 5 years.  
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6. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is useful for a number of reasons.  First, sensitivity testing 
explores the robustness of the results to variations in model parameters.  For 
example: 
•  Do the results presented in the above section hold (in particular the relative 
costs of an ETS versus ‘NZ pays’) with higher or lower carbon prices? 
Second, sensitivity analysis allows us to research the functional relationships 
between parameters of the ETS and effects on the economy.  For example: 
•  Does the ETS impact on GDP increase exponentially with an increasing price 
of carbon? 
•  Do emissions reductions increase with an increasing price of carbon or are 
there diminishing marginal returns? 
•  How does the amount of carbon leakage change with an increasing price of 
carbon? 
There are a number of model parameters and assumptions that can be addressed 
with sensitivity analysis.  In this work, we investigate three parameters for 
sensitivity analysis:  
•  the price of carbon – we assess the way the model results respond to changes in 
the price of carbon. 
•  emissions projections, in particular net forestry emissions – forestry 
sequestration provides a significant offset to New Zealand’s total emissions; 
we test the sensitivity of model results to a more optimistic view of forestry 
sequestration than the Ministry for the Environment  baseline. 
•  the degree of free allocation – we run a scenario with indefinite free allocation 
at 2013 levels.  
•  the potential impact of new emission reduction technologies becoming 
available. 
6.1 Price 
Our initial sensitivity test explores the robustness of the results to changes in the 
price of carbon.  To 2012, we select prices at NZ$15 and NZ$55 to provide 
indicative low and high price possibilities over CP1.  Similarly, to 2025 we 
choose prices of NZ$25 and NZ$70, based on the expectation that the price of 
carbon will rise over this period.
21  We suggest these prices are neither 
particularly ‘heroic’ or ‘pessimistic’, but provide a reasonable range of ‘what 
might be’.  We compare both the ETS and ‘NZ pays’ scenarios, however for 
brevity we report only GDP impacts. 
                                                 
21 See for example Bugnion 2007, a Point Carbon report suggesting that most firms in the EU expect the price 
of carbon to rise over the long term.  
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6.1.1 Robustness of key results to price sensitivity 
Table 9 highlights the GDP impacts of the ETS and ‘NZ pays’ scenarios for the 
range of prices, for each of the analysis years.  The results show: 
•  The GDP impact of the ETS is reasonably proportional to the price of carbon; 
the range of GDP impact is likely to fall between -0.3 and -0.7% of GDP in the 
CP1 period, while in 2025 the range is between -1.3% and -3.6% of GDP 
versus what might otherwise have been. 
•  The burden of the ETS on the overall economy remains significantly higher 
than under a ‘NZ pays’ scenario, across the range of plausible carbon prices. 
•  As the price of carbon increases, this result becomes even more emphatic i.e. 
the burden of the ETS increases at a greater rate than the cost of the ‘NZ pays’ 
scenarios. 
 
Table 9 GDP impacts at variable carbon prices 
% change to what might otherwise have been 
 
2012 Results 
Scenario  $15 $40 $55 
ETS -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 
NZ pays  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
2015 Results 
Scenario  $25 $40 $70 
ETS -0.6 -0.9 -1.5 
NZ  pays  -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
2025 Results 
Scenario  $25 $40 $70 
ETS -1.3 -2.1 -3.6 





6.1.2 Relationships between impact and price 
The relationship between the price of carbon and the ETS impact on GDP, 
emissions and leakage are summarised Table 10.  The key points are listed below: 
•  For any of the years analysed, an increase in the price of carbon leads to a 
relatively proportional increase in the impact on GDP. 
•  For any of the years analysed, an increase in the price of carbon leads to an 
approximately proportional increase in emissions reductions. 
•  However, the reduction in emissions do not increase at the same rate as the 
reduction in GDP, indicating diminishing marginal returns to emissions 
reduction.  The marginal cost metric highlights this by showing the additional 
cost to the economy of reducing emissions by another one percent.  As the  
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price for carbon and emissions reductions increase, the cost of further 
reductions also increases.  In 2025, the cost of an extra percent emissions 
reduction is over $100 million more expensive under a price of $70/ton than 
$25/ton.   
•  Both total leakage and leakage as a proportion of total emissions reduction 
increase as the price of carbon increases. 
 
Table 10 Functional relationships: price vs. GDP impact 
Units are % change to what otherwise might have been, unless otherwise stated 
 
2012 Results 
Metric  $15 $40 $55 
GDP -0.2  -0.5  -0.7 
Emissions -1.0  -2.5  -3.3 
Emissions/GDP 5.9  5.4  5.1 
Marginal cost of emissions 
($million/1% emissions reduction)  
360 408 439 
Leakage (Kt CO2-e) 16 56 88 
2015 Results 
Metric  $25 $40 $70 
GDP -0.6  -0.9  -1.5 
Emissions -3.3  -5.1  -8.2 
Emissions/GDP 5.8  5.6  5.4 
Marginal cost of emissions 
($million/1% emissions reduction) 
269 273 275 
Leakage (Kt CO2-e) 572  930  1672 
2025 Results 
Metric  $25 $40 $70 
GDP -1.3  -2.1  -3.6 
Emissions -5.0  -7.8  -12.9 
Emissions/GDP 3.9  3.8  3.6 
Marginal cost of emissions 
($million/1% emissions reduction) 
904 925  1015 





6.2 Emissions  projections 
Section 4.3 highlighted how the baseline emissions projections, sourced from the 
Ministry for the Environment, show a large increase in emissions circa 2025 due 
to forestry harvesting.  We use these projections in good faith, however we 
acknowledge particular uncertainty around forestry emissions estimates.  As a 
sensitivity analysis, we therefore evaluate a scenario where forestry emissions  
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remain at projected 2012 levels.  Figure 13 shows this alternative emissions 
scenario, which results in projected 2025 emissions of 80.4 Mt CO2-e emissions 
versus 117.7 mt CO2-e under the Ministry for the Environment projections.  We 
complete the analysis for 2025.   
6.2.1 Robustness of key results to alternative emissions projection 
 
Figure 12 Alternative emissions projection 









1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 2023 2027 2031
Emissions - baseline
Emissions - alternative scenario
Impact of reduction in 
deforestation
 
Source:  NZIER, Ministry for the Environment 
 
Table 11 highlights the economy impacts of the ETS and ‘NZ pays’ scenarios 
under the alternative emissions profile.  Table 12 highlights the industry effects of 
the ETS under the alternative emission profile.  The results show: 
•  Impacts on GDP reduce from -2.1% to -1.6%.  
•  The impact of the ‘NZ pays’ scenario is reduced from -0.7% to -0.2% of GDP.   
•  The industry results show that emissions intensive industries contract more 
under the alternative low emissions scenario.  A smaller offshore payment 
results in a smaller depreciation of the exchange rate, which in turn reduces 
export volumes.  Leakage of emissions increases.   
•  Reduction in the offshore payment means a reduced taxation burden on 
household consumption however, and thus service industries and property fare 
relatively better.   
In summary, the domestic effects of the ETS on emitting industries are not 
improved under a scenario with decreased forestry emissions.  
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Table 11 Impacts on the economy under alternative emissions 
projections, 2025 
 





Govt pays – 
alternative 
emissions 
GDP (% change)  -2.1  -1.6  -0.7  -0.2 
Change in GDP ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,971  -4,711  -1,362  -460 
Private consumption (% change)  -3.0  -1.4  -2.5  -0.8 
Change in private consumption ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,462  -2,491  -4,472  -1,491 
Change in private consumption per household ($, 2008 
prices) -3,027  -1,381  -2,479  -826 
Domestic government spending (% change)  -3.0  -1.4  -2.5  -0.8 
Investment (% change)  -3.4  -2.9  -0.7  -0.2 


















Average inflation adjusted wages (% change)  -6.7  -5.6  -1.7  -0.6 
Change in average inflation adjusted wages ($ per 
ordinary  hour)  -2.3 -1.9 -0.6 -0.2 
Payments to owners of productive land (% change)  -14.8  -16.9  3.7  1.2 
Payments to owners of capital (% change)  -4.0  -2.8  -1.8  -0.6 
Exports (% change in quantities)  0.0  -2.2  3.3  1.1 
Export prices (% change)  -0.2  0.4  -0.8  -0.3 
Domestic prices (% change)  -0.9  -0.2  -1.2  -0.4 
Imports (% change in quantities)  -3.5  -2.6  -1.5  -0.5 
Inflation adjusted (real) exchange rate (% change)  -1.7  -0.7  -1.5  -0.5 
Kyoto liability payment ($m,  2008  prices)  1,855 403 2,231 740 
Domestic emissions (% change)  -10.4  -10.7  0.0  0.0 
Change in emissions (kilotonnes of CO2-e) -12,192  -12,564  0  0 
Leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e) 3,001  -3,434  0  0 
Change in domestic emissions net of leakage (kilotonnes 
of CO2-e) -9,191  -9,131  0  0 
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Horticulture and fruit growing  4.9  3.1  1.9 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -6.6  -7.7  1.1 
Dairy farming  -12.9  -13.7  0.9 
Other farming  0.1  -0.7  0.8 
Services to primary industry  -2.0  -2.9  0.9 
Forestry and logging  1.7  0.8  0.9 
Fishing 2.4  0.3  2.1 
Mining and quarrying  -3.8  -4.2  0.3 
Oil and gas exploration and extraction  -1.0  -1.2  0.2 
Meat processing  -5.7  -6.8  1.2 
Dairy product manufacturing  -11.7  -12.5  0.9 
Other food and beverage manufacturing  1.4  0.8  0.6 
Textiles clothing and footwear  3.6  2.2  1.4 
Timber and wood products  2.0  0.7  1.4 
Paper & paper product manufacturing  0.7  -1.8  2.5 
Printing and publishing  0.8  0.6  0.2 
Petroleum product refining and manufacturing  -12.5  -11.3  -1.2 
Fertiliser manufacturing -7.3  -8.8  1.5 
Cement and other non-metallic mineral product manufacturing  -3.9  -3.2  -0.7 
Basic metal manufacturing  -5.0  -6.0  1.1 
Other manufacturing  2.0  0.5  1.5 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  -4.9  -4.6  -0.3 
Property and construction services  -3.4  -2.4  -1.0 
Transport services  -1.9  -2.6  0.7 
Business services  -1.8  -1.2  -0.6 
Government and personal services  -2.4  -0.9  -1.5 
Other services  -1.7  -0.9 -0.8 
Notes:  (1)  Change in contribution to GDP is equal to the change in an industry’s “value added”. 
              (2)          Rows may not sum due to rounding 
 
Source: NZIER 
6.3 Indefinite  free  allocation 
In this sensitivity, we propose the scenario whereby the government’s free 
allocation of NZ emission permits is continued indefinitely at 2013 levels.  Under 
this scenario, the ETS has been implemented across the full scope of industries 
intended, including agriculture, however free allocation to ‘at risk’ industries 
continues at 2013 levels rather than phasing out to zero as is the current design.    
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We suggest this is a possible policy position for the government, given an 
obligation to take up the challenge to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, but 
a desire to protect key industries from uncertainty and non-level playing fields in 
the international market.  We provide analysis for 2025.   
6.3.1 Results of indefinite free allocation, 2025 
In 2025, an ETS with indefinite free allocation reduces GDP by -1.2% compared 
to -2.1% under the ETS with phased out free allocation.  Emissions reductions are 
-4.2% compared to-10.4% under phased out free allocation, however leakage 
emissions of almost 3,000 kt CO2-e are eliminated.   
 





free allocation  Difference 
GDP (% change)  -2.1  -1.2  -0.9 
Change in GDP ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,971  -3,489  -2482 
Private consumption (% change)  -3.0  -2.7  -0.3 
Change in private consumption ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,462  -4,928  -534 
Change in private consumption per household ($, 2008 prices)  -3,027  -2,731  -296 
Domestic government spending (% change)  -3.0  -2.7  -0.3 
Investment (% change)  -3.4  -1.5  -1.9 
Employment (% change)  0 by assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Employment change (Full time equivalents)  0 by assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Average inflation adjusted wages (% change)  -6.7  -4.3  -2.4 
Change in average inflation adjusted wages ($ per ordinary hour)  -2.3  -1.5  -0.8 
Payments to owners of productive land (% change)  -14.8  -1.4  -13.5 
Payments to owners of capital (% change)  -4.0  -2.1  -1.9 
Exports (% change in quantities)  0.0  2.0  -2.0 
Export prices (% change)  -0.2  -0.4  0.3 
Domestic prices (% change)  -0.9  -0.3  -0.6 
Imports (% change in quantities)  -3.5  -2.2  -1.3 
Inflation adjusted (real) exchange rate (% change)  -1.7  -1.0  -0.7 
Kyoto liability payment ($m, 2008 prices)  1,855  2,037  -182 
Domestic emissions (% change)  -10.4  -4.2  -6.2 
Change in emissions (kilotonnes of CO2-e) -12,192  -4,924  -7,268 
Leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e) 3,001  88  2,913 
Change in domestic emissions net of leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-
e) -9,191  -4,836 -4,355 
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A common argument against free allocation is that the burden of emissions is 
passed back onto taxpayers/consumers, instead of on the emitters themselves.   
Our results show that the improvement in exports and the domestic economy more 
than compensate for the extra burden in tax, with household consumption down -
2.7% versus -3.0% under no free allocation.  This can be best understood from an 
analysis of wages under each scenario.  Full phase-out of allocation causes a 
significant cut to real wages of -6.7% and subsequent reduction in consumption.  
With free allocation continued indefinitely, the wage reduction is a relatively 
modest -4.3%, resulting in a smaller contraction in household consumption.    
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ETS – Indefinite 
free allocation  Difference 
Horticulture and fruit growing  4.9  2.5  2.5 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -6.6  0.1  -6.7 
Dairy farming  -12.9  -0.6  -12.3 
Other farming  0.1  0.6  -0.5 
Services to primary industry  -2.0  0.4  -2.4 
Forestry and logging  1.7  0.9  0.8 
Fishing 2.4  -0.3  2.7 
Mining and quarrying  -3.8  -2.2  -1.6 
Oil and gas exploration and extraction  -1.0  -0.6  -0.4 
Meat processing  -5.7  0.3  -5.9 
Dairy product manufacturing  -11.7  -0.4  -11.2 
Other food and beverage manufacturing  1.4  0.2  1.2 
Textiles clothing and footwear  3.6  2.1  1.5 
Timber and wood products  2.0  1.4  0.7 
Paper & paper product manufacturing  0.7  3.5  -2.8 
Printing and publishing  0.8  0.2  0.6 
Petroleum product refining and manufacturing  -12.5  -13.8  1.3 
Fertiliser manufacturing -7.3  0.8  -8.1 
Cement and other non-metallic mineral product manufacturing  -3.9  -1.7  -2.1 
Basic metal manufacturing  -5.0  1.5  -6.5 
Other manufacturing  2.0  2.0  0.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  -4.9  -4.1  -0.8 
Property and construction services  -3.4  -2.2  -1.2 
Transport services  -1.9  -1.5  -0.4 
Business services  -1.8  -1.8  0.0 
Government and personal services  -2.4  -2.4  0.0 
Other services  -1.7  -1.4  -0.3 
Notes: (1)  Change in contribution to GDP is equal to the change in an industry’s “value added”. 
            (2)       Rows  may not sum due to rounding 
Source: NZIER 
By shielding agriculture from the full burden of the ETS, contributions to GDP 
from dairy farming and dairy processing fall by just 0.6% and 0.4% respectively, 
compared to 12.9% and 11.7% under a 2025 scenario with no free allocation.  
Sheep and beef farming, and meat processing contribute slight increases to GDP 
of 0.1% and 0.3%, compared to reductions of 6.6% and 5.7% respectively with no 
free allocation.  Emissions leakage in these farming and processing industries are 
eliminated.    
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Similarly manufacturing industries benefit from compensation for increased 
production costs; basic metals and fertilizer manufacturing contributions to GDP 
increase by 1.5% and 0.8% relative to what might have otherwise been under an 
indefinite free allocation scenario.  This is in direct contrast to significant 
contractions of 5.0% and 7.3% in these industries under a 2025 no free allocation 
scenario. 
6.3.2 Comments on indefinite free allocation 
The results presented above highlight how free allocation is a powerful 
mechanism within the ETS to spread the burden of impact.  Free allocation will 
mean that polluters will not fully internalise the cost of their emissions, however:  
•  Industries such as agriculture face uneven playing fields when, to the best of 
our knowledge, no other country has signalled an intention to burden 
agricultural emissions. 
•  Leakage issues mean reductions in New Zealand’s emissions may not result in 
reduction in global emissions, and thus New Zealand bares a cost for no global 
benefit. 
•  Household consumption is not necessarily adversely effected by increased free 
allocation to industry.  Incorporating economy-wide effects through analysis in 
a CGE model highlights how reducing the burden on industry can create 
positive flow-on effects for households, particularly in the case of agricultural 
industries that drive New Zealand exports. 
6.4  New emission reduction technologies 
Our model has been created to incorporate information or assumptions about 
possible new abatement technologies that might become available as a result of 
the imposition of prices on greenhouse gases. New technologies – or existing ones 
that make economic sense once an ETS is in place – could provide useful 
emission reduction benefits and reduce the cost on the economy of an ETS 
through giving businesses and farmers a way to avoid some of the costs associated 
with their emissions.  
NZIER has been researching the potential for emission reduction through 
adoption of new technologies and practices. We have found that there are limited 
opportunities for reducing emissions through technology change in agriculture 
and given the preponderance of agricultural emissions in New Zealand’s 
emissions profile there are limited opportunities for technology enabled 
reductions in New Zealand in aggregate.  
We have not included emissions reductions through technological changes in our 
main results as the availability of such technologies is uncertain and controversial. 
Furthermore, Government is, we understand, currently engaged in research 
evaluating the potential for emission reductions from adopting new technologies 
or practices (i.e. abatement cost curves). We will be able to use this information  
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when it is available, but have set the issue aside for further research once we have 
the benefit of information from Government.  
 
Table 15 Impacts on the economy, 2025 – technology change sensitivity 




ETS – with technology 
change 
ETS - indefinite free 
allocation 
GDP (% change)  -2.1  -1.9  -1.2 
Change in GDP ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,971  -5,412  -3,489 
Private consumption (% change)  -3.0  -2.7  -2.7 
Change in private consumption ($m, 2008 prices)  -5,462  -4,855  -4,928 
Change in private consumption per household ($, 2008 prices)  -3,027  -2,691  -2,731 
Domestic government spending (% change)  -3.0  -2.7  -2.7 
Investment (% change)  -3.4  0.0  -1.5 
Employment (% change) 
0 by 
assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Employment change (Full time equivalents) 
0 by 
assumption  0 by assumption  0 by assumption 
Average inflation adjusted wages (% change)  -6.7  -6.2  -4.3 
Change in average inflation adjusted wages ($ per ordinary hour)  -2.3  -2.1  -1.5 
Payments to owners of productive land (% change)  -14.8  -13.1  -1.4 
Payments to owners of capital (% change)  -4.0  -3.5  -2.1 
Exports (% change in quantities)  0.0  -0.1  2.0 
Export prices (% change)  -0.2  -0.1  -0.4 
Domestic prices (% change)  -0.9  -0.7  -0.3 
Imports (% change in quantities)  -3.5  -3.1  -2.2 
Inflation adjusted (real) exchange rate (% change)  -1.7  -1.4  -1.0 
Kyoto liability payment ($m, 2008 prices)  1,855  1,623  2,037 
Domestic emissions (% change)  -10.4  -18.2  -4.2 
Change in emissions (kilotonnes of CO2-e) -12,192  -21,459  -4,924 
Leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e) 3,001  -2,953  88 
Change in domestic emissions net of leakage (kilotonnes of CO2-e) -9,191  -18,506  -4,836 




We have, however, tested the sensitivity of our overall conclusions to assumptions 
about technological change. To do this we have assumed that new technologies 
are available which can reduce emissions across major emitting industries by an 
average of 10% and that new technologies or practices can reduce emissions in 
agriculture by up to 20%.  
When we adopt those assumptions in our model the balance of impacts on the 
economy do not change from our main findings (see Table 15). We find that costs 
to the economy are more sensitive to changes in the quantity of permits allocated  
NZIER – The impact of the proposed Emissions Trading Scheme on New Zealand’s economy  51 
freely to industry and agriculture than to assumptions about emissions reductions. 
This is because with a, for example, relatively generous assumption of a 20% 
reduction in emissions intensity in agriculture, farmers’ costs increase 
proportionately more than they would if free allocation is maintained at 2013 
levels indefinitely as discussed above (see Table 16). 
 
Table 16 Industry contributions to GDP, 2025: technology change impacts 
Percent change compared to what would otherwise have been the case. 
 
ETS 
ETS – with 
technology change 
ETS – indefinite 
free allocation 
Horticulture and fruit growing  4.9  4.2  2.5 
Sheep and beef cattle farming  -6.6  -5.5  0.1 
Dairy farming  -12.9  -10.8  -0.6 
Other farming  0.1  0.0  0.6 
Services to primary industry  -2.0  -1.7  0.4 
Forestry and logging  1.7  1.4  0.9 
Fishing 2.4  1.6  -0.3 
Mining and quarrying  -3.8  -3.7  -2.2 
Oil and gas exploration and extraction  -1.0  -1.0  -0.6 
Meat processing  -5.7  -4.7  0.3 
Dairy product manufacturing  -11.7  -9.8  -0.4 
Other food and beverage manufacturing  1.4  1.1  0.2 
Textiles clothing and footwear  3.6  3.3  2.1 
Timber and wood products  2.0  1.5  1.4 
Paper & paper product manufacturing  0.7  -0.3  3.5 
Printing and publishing  0.8  0.7  0.2 
Petroleum product refining and manufacturing -12.5  -12.3  -13.8 
Fertiliser manufacturing -7.3  -6.2  0.8 
Cement and other non-metallic mineral product manufacturing  -3.9  -3.5  -1.7 
Basic metal manufacturing  -5.0  -5.2  1.5 
Other manufacturing  2.0  1.6  2.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply  -4.9  -4.8  -4.1 
Property and construction services  -3.4  -3.0  -2.2 
Transport services  -1.9  -2.0  -1.5 
Business services  -1.8  -1.6  -1.8 
Government and personal services  -2.4  -2.1  -2.4 
Other services  -1.7  -1.5  -1.4 
Notes:  (1)  Change in contribution to GDP is equal to the change in an industry’s “value added”. 
 
Source: NZIER 
When we assume technology change there is also only limited impact on the 
amount of leakage caused by the ETS – compared with an elimination of leakage 
under the indefinite free allocation scenario.   
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New technologies for reducing emissions would have to produce dramatic 
reductions in agricultural emissions at low cost before they could offset the costs 
to the economy of the proposed ETS.  
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7. Concluding remarks 
Our research suggests that the proposed New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) will have larger economic impacts on New Zealand than has been 
suggested by the Government’s analysis.  
In 2012, the combined economic impact of an ETS and the cost of paying New 
Zealand’s Kyoto liability, is a: 
•  $900 million reduction in GDP 
•  $600 reduction in an average household’s spending 
•  reduction in employment equivalent to 22,000 jobs 
Most of these costs can be attributed to the ETS, rather the cost of paying for New 
Zealand’s Kyoto liability. The cost to the economy (i.e. GDP) of the ETS is more 
than eight times larger than if the Government meets its Kyoto liability through 
financing emission reductions abroad.  
Longer term, the economy has more time to adjust to the impact of the ETS, but 
our analysis shows that an ETS remains three times more costly than paying for 
emissions reductions elsewhere in the world. 
In 2025, the combined economic impact of an ETS and the cost of paying for an 
international emission reduction obligation, is a (in today’s prices): 
•  $5.9 billion reduction in GDP 
•  $3,000 reduction in an average household’s spending 
•  reduction in hourly wages equivalent to $2.30 per hour. 
Moreover, for the additional cost that an ETS imposes on the New Zealand 
economy, New Zealand achieves 5% less emissions reductions, in terms of global 
emissions, than we could achieve if we funded emissions reductions elsewhere in 
the world.  
This suggests that the ETS, as currently proposed, may not be a least cost solution 
for mitigating the impacts of climate change.  
This finding is in step with earlier work by NZIER: 
The reality is that it may prove cheaper to pay emitters in another 
country to reduce emissions rather than to achieve any reduction 
within New Zealand. (NZIER, 2007) 
Our research goes some way to proving that this is the case.  
The main driver behind this is our assumption that New Zealand exporters are 
unable to increase their prices to reflect the cost of climate change mitigation  
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policies. If climate change measures are adopted elsewhere in the world such that 
that assumption no longer holds true, then we would need to revise our analysis.     
Without equivalent measures being adopted elsewhere in the world the cost of an 
ETS would fall largely on export industries, especially the agricultural sector. In 
the agricultural sector in 2025: 
•  activity in dairy farming declines -12.9%  
•  dairy land prices decline by -40.6% 
•  sheep and beef farming activity declines -6.6% 
•  prices of land used in sheep and beef farming fall -23.4%   
The impact on the agricultural sector is also a major source of leakage – where 
emission reductions occur in New Zealand only because production is displaced 
with production elsewhere in the world. Our analysis suggests that the ETS causes 
leakage from the pastoral sector equivalent to more than 3 million tonnes of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
Another sector heavily impacted includes basic metals manufacturing where 
investment declines and plant, machinery, and equipment and other capital falls 
by 6.5%. There is also a 3.4% reduction in employment in the sector. 
The variation in impacts of the ETS across different industries also means quite 
variable impacts across New Zealand’s regions  - being that regions have different 
concentrations of industries. The regional economies of Northland and Southland 
contract more than any other region as a result of the ETS. This is because both 
regions have relatively significant concentrations of agricultural production and 
both have substantial employment in large industries that contract due to the ETS 
– basic metals (aluminium) manufacturing in the case of Southland and petroleum 
refining in the case of Northland.  
The economies of regions with high concentrations of service industries and 
public sector employment, such as Auckland and Wellington, do not contract by 
as much as more rural regions.  
The impacts of an ETS change considerably when allocations of emissions 
permits are not phased out. In 2025, an ETS with indefinite free allocation reduces 
GDP by 1.2% compared to 2.1% under the ETS with phased out free allocation.  
Emissions reductions are 4.2% compared to 10.4% under phased out free 
allocation, however leakage emissions of almost 3,000 kt CO2-e are eliminated.   
The reason for this result is that indefinite free allocation (at initial allocation 
levels, so not entirely free allocation) minimises negative impacts on export 
competitiveness.  
While there is a common argument against free allocation that the burden of 
emissions is passed back onto taxpayers/consumers, instead of on the emitters  
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themselves.  Our results show that the improvement in exports and the domestic 
economy more than compensate for the extra burden, with household 
consumption down 2.7% versus 3.0% under no free allocation.  
We also find that costs to the economy are more sensitive to changes in the 
quantity of permits allocated freely to industry and agriculture than to 
assumptions about emissions reductions through technology change.    
That being so, our research suggests that further thought needs to be given to 
allocation of emissions units and especially to the allocation phase out as currently 
envisaged in the draft bill. 
NZIER (2007) has already suggested how the issue of permit allocation could best 
be dealt with to minimise unnecessary costs to firms facing international 
competition. We have proposed: 
•  New Zealand firms subject to international competition from producers likely 
to be facing no or limited effective emissions charges should receive a gratis 
allocation of emission entitlements. 
•  To incentivise the firm receiving the entitlement to reduce its emissions, but 
not constrain efficient growth in output, the level of gratis allocation should, if 
practicable, be based on an international ‘best practice’ standard per unit of 
output. 
•  The ‘best practice’ standard could be set at the world best standard or at some 
point, such as, the upper quartile or top decile level for plants in an 
international peer group for which data are available.  
For smaller entities, the information costs of finding and checking peer group data 
may be too great, and their gratis allocation could be based on some percentage 
less than 100% of their historical emissions per unit of output. They should have 
the option of having their allocation determined on the basis of the emissions of 
an international peer group if they wish, however.  
The Government commissioned review of the proposed ETS reached conclusions 
that our similar to ours (Kerr, 2007): 
…several very important aspects of the proposal require further 
development… [including] …the need for clear thinking on interred 
leakage and allocation issues; how to achieve a smooth, low risk 
transition; (p.1) 
Any policy used to address leakage should be simple and closely 
targeted. It should be designed to phase out as other countries 
regulate their emissions [emphasis added]. (p.7) 
In the agriculture sector, [output-based or intensity-based allocation] 
could simultaneously address the question of how to freely allocate 
units that intend to compensate for capital losses (loss of land values). 
(p.7  
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Appendix B Technical detail of the model 
B.1 ORANI-G 
Our results were produced on a new model of the New Zealand economy based on 
a tried and tested generic model (ORANI-G) that has been found effective for 
policy analysis in Australia and around the world. The model has been calibrated 
to the local setting and loaded with New Zealand data. The assumptions needed 
are based on consultation with industry specialists and reflect best practice. 
The model has been developed with considerable assistance from CGE modelling 
experts at the Centre for Policy Studies at Monash University in Melbourne 
Australia.  
B.2 Database  structure 
The model is based on a large database containing the value flows of the 
economy, as per Figure 13.  The database defines the initial structure of the 
economy, which by definition is assumed to be in equilibrium in all markets.  The 
structure of the database is broadly similar to traditional input-output tables; for 
example commodities may be used as intermediate input for further production, 
utilised in investment, exported or consumed by households and the government.  
Industry costs include the cost of intermediates, margins, taxes and primary factor 
costs for labour, land and capital.  As per the accounting identities in input-output 
tables, the total value sum of producers’ input costs (including margins, taxes, 
returns to factors and other costs) equates to the total value of output production 
(the ‘MAKE’ matrix in the database).    
The ORANI-NZ model consists of: 
•  131 industries 
•  210 commodities 
•  14 regions 
•  1 household 
•  24 occupations 
The database has been sourced initially from Statistics NZ 1995/96 Inter-Industry 
tables, updated using the subsequently released 2003 Supply and Use Tables, and 
finally ‘up-scaled’ to 2007 levels using latest Statistics NZ macroeconomic data.   
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Figure 13 The ORANI-NZ database 
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Source:  Horridge, 2008; NZIER 
 
B.3 Production  structure (Horridge, 2008) 
The production structure of the model is presented in Figure 14.  Each industry 
can produce a number of different commodities. Production inputs are 
intermediate commodities, both domestic and imported, and primary factors 
labour, land and capital.  Working from bottom to top, we see constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) production nests for occupations, primary factors and the 
choice between imported and domestic commodities.  In this case, an increase in 
price moves sourcing towards another input, for example if the price of imports  
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increases, more domestic commodities are demanded in the intermediate sourcing 
CES nest.    
 

















































Source: Horridge,  2008 
 
At the activity level, intermediate goods, primary factors and other costs are 
combined using a Leontif production function.  This means the proportion of 
production inputs does not change.  On the output side, there are two further 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
22 nests.  The production mix of each 
industry is dependent on the relative prices of each commodity.  Similarly, the 
                                                 
22 A CET function is identical to a CES function except that the transformation parameter has the opposite 
sign (i.e. increasing price increases output in a CET; in a CES, increasing price reduces demand)  
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export nest determines local and export market shares depending on relative 
prices. 
B.4 Regional  extension 
Policy impacts are often unevenly spread across industries and regions.  To 
capture these heterogeneous effects, the model is extended to include a regional 
component.  A ‘top-down’ approach is used to decompose national impacts to the 
regional level, using regional employment data as weighting.  If a region has a 
high share of national output, then its regional industry output will be 
proportionally affected.  The exception is industries that produce commodities 
(mostly services) that are largely consumed within a region.  These are deemed to 
be local industries, and it is assumed that their output moves in line with the local 
demand for the corresponding commodity, rather than with the national industry 
output.  Note that an inherent assumption in the ‘top-down’ approach is that 
industries uses the same production technology across all regions (Horridge, 
2008).   
B.5 NZGREEN 
The previous sections have detailed the adaption of the basic ORANI-G model 
framework for NZ.  Further enhancements have been developed in order to model 
the ETS.  These include: 
•  Incorporation of economy-wide emissions flows by fuel type, including 
combustion and non-combustion emissions. 
•  Disaggregation of the electricity generation industry by fuel type to enable the 
evaluation of relative industry cost changes due to the ETS. 
•  Ability to introduce abatement at a cost to specific industries. 
•  Calculation of leakage. 
B.5.1 Tracking  Greenhouse  Gases 
Emissions data, sourced from MfE’s long-term projections and Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory 1990-2005, and Statistics NZ energy flow tables, have been included in 
the model.  A section of the emissions matrix is highlighted in Table 17.  The first 
three columns provide emissions from burning fuels.  This data is based on the 
2003 energy flow tables from Statistics New Zealand with fuel sources aggregated 
into coal, gas and petroleum products, and scaled to meet MfE’s Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory 1990-2005 combustion emissions.  The final Activity column are non-
combustion emissions, also sourced from the Inventory.   
The table tracks emissions through the economy; for example, the majority of 
emissions from agricultural sectors falls under the Activity or non-combustion 
column, while electricity generation emissions stem from the fuel source used 
(e.g. coal or gas) plus a relatively small amount of fugitive or Activity emissions.    
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This comprehensive accounting of emissions allows the emissions intensity of 
production to be industry and fuel-type specific.  Combustion emissions are 
proportional to fuel usage, while Activity emissions are proportional to industry 
output. 
 
Table 17 Emissions matrix example 
Units are kT CO2-e 
 Coal  Gas  Petroleum 
Products  Activity 
Sheep and beef farming  0.00  0.00  298.31  15188.51 
Dairy farming  0.00  0.00  248.74  22351.74 
Basic metals  1471.93  85.11  61.73  2327.10 
Electricity generation – coal  2235.49  0.00  0.00  232.52 
Electricity generation – gas 
peak 0.00  2895.36  0.00  694.39 
Electricity generation – 
geothermal 0.00  0.00  0.00  363.34 
Waste 0.00  10.48  0.35  1645.70 
 
 
Source:  MfE, Statistics NZ, NZIER 
 
B.5.2 Disaggregation  of  electricity generation 
The electricity generation industry is disaggregated into gas base-load, gas peak-
load, coal, oil, wind, hydro and geo-thermal.  Gas, coal and oil type generators are 
large emitters that face increased costs under an ETS.  Non-emitting generators 
such as wind and hydro are not effected, however fugitive emissions from geo-
thermal electricity generation are included.  A CES function determines how these 
relative changes in production costs effects the electricity supply split.  In line 
with previous work, the elasticity of substitution is set at 5. 
B.5.3 Abatement 
Abatement opportunities are dealt with in two distinct methods within the model.   
•  Improvement in energy-efficiency at a cost – combustion emissions abatement 
can occur through energy-saving technological change.  The level of abatement 
for a given price is exogenous to the model.  The cost of energy-saving 
abatement is passed through as an increase in requirement for capital.  This 
methodology is a realistic representation of how abatement occurs in practice: 
energy-saving abatement requires some investment in new capital e.g. a new 
light bulb, housing insulation, or a more efficient car. 
•  Activity emissions abatement – abatement of non-combustion Activity 
emissions are considered in relation to the price of carbon. New technologies 
are taken up based on estimated abatement cost curves and the cost of 
abatement is transmitted to the production function through a deterioration in 
all-input augmenting technological change.      
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Abatement opportunities for key emitting industries have been investigated 
through discussion with key industry stakeholders, researchers, and engineers, 
resulting in the development of industry-specific marginal abatement cost curves.  
We believe the curves we have developed are plausible, however, for this initial 
paper, no abatement is included in the modelling scenarios because the extent of 
abatement opportunities is controversial.   
Our assumptions have proved to be very controversial amongst industry and 
Government officials that we have consulted with. The Government is currently 
working on its own set of abatement curves for New Zealand and we prefer to 
wait until that work has been completed so that we can compare it with our results 
and come up with a best-guess estimate of abatement opportunities. Moreover 
comparable analysis to ours, commissioned by Government (Infometrics, 2007), 
did not incorporate abatement so excluding abatement ensures our results are 
comparable to that existing analysis.    
B.5.3.1 Leakage 
A further addition to the model for the analysis of the ETS is the inclusion of an 
emissions leakage calculation.  Emissions savings from reductions to exports, 
together with any emissions reductions from decreased domestic share of the local 
market are considered leakage emissions – emissions savings for NZ but not for 
the world.  This is based on the assumption that the world market replaces any 
reduction in NZ exports with supply from some other country.  Note that the 
leakage calculation is most likely a conservative estimate, as it assumes that NZ 
and the rest of the world have identical emissions intensities of production.  For 
key NZ export industries such as agriculture however, research has shown NZ 
producers are far less energy intensive than some overseas countries (see for 
example Saunders et al “Food miles - Comparative Energy/Emissions 
Performance of New Zealand’s Agriculture Industry”, Lincoln University 2006).   
 
 